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Edith Hotchkiss, Nadya Malenko, Hassan Tehranian
ABSTRACT:
In the rst essay, In this paper, I examine how the connections between activist hedge funds and
other institutional investors aect the activist campaigns. I identify a positive causal eect of long-
term relationships with other investors on the short-run and long-run performance of activists’ target
companies. Overall, my results highlight that connections to other institutional investors benet insti-
tutional asset managers.
In the second essay, we show that rms in the same board-interlock networks tend to have sim-
ilar corporate governance practices. We utilize a novel instrument based on staggered adoptions of
universal demand laws across states to identify causal peer eects in rms’ decisions to adopt various
governance provisions. The impact of universal demand laws on the incentives faced by directors as
they seek to maximize their career outcomes is a likely mechanism explaining these eects.
In the third essay, I investigate whether hedge funds employ short sales to mask their exiting in-
tention when they engage in shareholder activism. Using a hand-collected sample, I nd that the prob-
ability of a spike in short interest before exit announcements is higher in rms targeted by activists
who have a history of short interest increase in their previous targets. According to my ndings, the
hypothesis is that these hedge funds are more likely to use short sales since they are more concerned
about locking their prot and not taking the risk of exit announcements. Overall, this paper provides
new evidence of a possible exiting strategy: Silent Exiting via short selling.
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First Chapter: Hedge FundActivists’ Network and Information
Flows
1 Introduction
Shareholder activists, which have become a dominant force in corporate governance, take posi-
tions in underperforming companies and push management for strategic, nancial, and governance
changes. One development that has aected the nature of activist campaigns and empowered ac-
tivists has been the development of strong ties to managers at other investment rms including
those at large mutual funds such as T. Rowe Price, Fidelity Investments, and Wellington Manage-
ment. 1 The goal of this paper is to examine whether connections with such investors aects the
performance and characteristics of activist campaigns. My main nding is that activist’s connected-
ness with other institutional investors has a strong positive eect on both the market reaction to its
engagements announcements and the long-run performance of its targets. I identify this eect using
turnovers of mutual fund managers as exogenous shocks to activists’ connectivity. I also explore
the channels through which connections between activists and other investors aect the activists’
performance.
There are at least two reasons to expect that activists with more connections to other investors
run more successful campaigns, both of which are related to information ows between activists
and other investors. The rst, which I refer to as the "information-gathering channel", is that well-
connected activists may receive information from other investors before selecting a target, allowing
them to target rms that have more potential for improvement. Indeed, communicating with other
investors prior to campaigns is a regular part of activists’ strategy, which enables them to garner
other investors’ opinions about potential targets. 2 Disappointed institutional shareholders could
1See "Despite Turbulence, Shareholder Activism Is Forecast to Stay Strong," The New York Times, March 18, 2016.
2"I’m happy to give people my thoughts on things I own and I’m happy to learn about how other people think
. . . Putting earplugs in and blinders on isn’t the smart approach," Greg Taxin, head of the activist strategy of hedge-fund
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be another important source of information for activists. Activist investors can benet from their
relationships with this group of investors and be invited to run campaigns against the management
of the rms they hold in their portfolio. 3
The second reason why connected activists may run better campaigns, which I refer to as the
"support channel", is that connections can help distribute information about the campaign among
investors, which can bring investors’ attention to targeted rms and help an activist obtain more
shareholder support for the campaign and be more inuential in its negotiations with management.
Activist investors themselves on average acquire only between 6% and 7% of their targets’ outstand-
ing shares (Brav et al., 2010), which means that support from other shareholders is necessary for a
successful campaign. ValueAct’s successful campaign targeting Microsoft, despite the fact that Val-
ueAct owned only 1% of Microsoft shares, provides an example of the importance of the relationship
between the activist and other investors.4 My ndings provide evidence for both the information-
gathering channel, whereby well-connected activists receive more information useful in selecting
a target, and the support channel, whereby well-connected activists distribute information about
their campaigns across the investor network, allowing them to gain higher shareholder support.
The rst step in examining whether connections positively aect activist engagements is to
construct measures that proxy for activists’ connectedness. To construct these measures, I build a
network of investors based on their past investment behavior in activists’ targets and then employ
centrality measures from Social Network Analysis (SNA) to create proxies for the position of an
activist in the investors’ informational network. Specically, I use institutional holdings and 13D
and 13G schedule lings data to identify institutional shareholders that signicantly5 increase their
positions in a given activist’s targets around activism announcements. I dene two investors (an
rm Clinton Group Inc. See "Activist Investors Leak their Plans to a Favored Few," The Wall Street Journal, March 27,
2014. This article also mentions private conversations between Elliott Management Corp. and Jana Partners LLC before
public announcements of an activist engagement.
3See "New Alliances in Battle for Corporate Control," The New York Times, March 18, 2014.
4See "Activists’ Secret Ally: Big Mutual Funds — Large investors quietly back campaigns to force change at U.S.
companies," The Wall Street Journal, August 10, 2015.
5By at least 1 percentage point in the main tests and by at least 2 percentage points in robustness tests.
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activist and a non-activist investor, or two non-activist investors) that signicantly increase their
ownership in the same target at a similar point in time as being connected over the subsequent ve
years (three years in robustness tests).
The motivation for using institutions’ past investment patterns in activists’ targets is twofold.
First, activists usually start communicating with other shareholders after announcing their cam-
paign, making them informationally connected. Second, the literature nds that blockholders that
hold the same securities in their portfolios are likely to be in the same information network (Pa-
reek, 2012; Ozsoylev et al., 2014) and tend to cooperate with each other to make positive changes in
companies where they own large stakes (Crane et al., 2016). After building the network of investors
in this way, I introduce centrality measures, as used in SNA, which capture the importance of each
investor in the network relative to other investors; these measures are used by many existing studies
on social networks in nancial markets. The rst centrality measure, Degree, captures the number
of connections between an investor and other investors in the network. The other centrality mea-
sure, Eigenvector, accounts for the quality of connections: it is a variation of Degree centrality in
which connections are weighted by their relative importance in the network.
In the next step, I relate these measures to the performance of hedge fund activist engagements.
The main variable that I use as a proxy for engagement performance is the abnormal return around
engagement announcements, which is widely used in the hedge fund activism literature.6 Control-
ling for various target and activist characteristics, as well as activist, year, and industry xed eects,
I nd that better-networked hedge fund activists experience a larger abnormal return in their tar-
gets around engagement announcements. The economic magnitude of these eects is meaningful:
a one standard deviation increase in Degree centrality of the activist increases the abnormal return
during the (-20, +20) announcement window by about 3 percentage points (from the 6 percentage
point sample average), and a one standard deviation increase in Eigenvector centrality increases the
6Later, I also use the success rate, the long-term return, and industry adjusted operating performance as alternative
measures of engagement performance.
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return by around 2.6 percentage points.
These results provide suggestive evidence that connections with institutional investors benet
hedge fund activists. Of course, an alternative explanation for these results is that omitted activist
characteristics are related both to the activist’s network position and to its performance. For exam-
ple, prior literature shows that engagements of well-reputed and experienced hedge fund activists
are associated with larger positive reactions from the market (e.g. Zur, 2009; Krishnan et al., 2015;
Boyson et al., 2016). Because well-reputed activists are also more likely to be followed by investors
and hence be more central, the positive correlation between activist centrality and announcement
returns could be explained by activist reputation or skill. Since these qualities develop over time,
controlling for activist xed-eects does not address this issue.
I therefore employ a novel identication strategy based on exogenous shocks to connections
between hedge fund activists and a subset of institutional investors (mutual funds, specically),
using turnovers of actively managed mutual fund managers. Managers’ social ties have been shown
to be an important part of the decision making process both in mutual funds (Hong et al., 2005; Cohen
et al., 2008) and in hedge funds (Gerritzen et al., 2016), and hence I expect turnovers of mutual fund
managers to aect the links between activists and mutual funds. To verify this hypothesis, I provide
two pieces of evidence. First, I show that the probability of an activist targeting a rm decreases
when it loses its connections with signicant shareholders of that rm. Second, I show that mutual
funds that have lost their prior connections with activist investors are less likely to increase their
ownership in the activists’ targets. These results conrm the hypothesis that mutual fund manager
turnovers disconnect hedge fund activists from mutual funds, allowing me to use them as shocks
to the level of connectivity of hedge fund activists. At the same time, these shocks are likely to
be exogenous in that turnovers of managers are not inuenced by mutual funds’ connections to
activists: for example, on average, activists’ targets constitute less than 1% of mutual fund portfolios.7
7As explained below, to alleviate additional identication concerns about using fund manager turnovers as exoge-
nous shocks, I conduct a placebo test using a pseudo activism sample.
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Constructing a measure showing how much of the activist’s network centrality is lost due to mu-
tual fund manager turnovers, I test whether losing connections with mutual fund managers aects
activists’ performance and the market reaction to their engagements. Controlling for fund, year, and
industry xed eects, I nd that a one standard deviation decrease in the percentage of connections
is associated with a 2.5 percentage point decrease in the abnormal return during the (-20, +20) an-
nouncement window, and a larger portion of this eect happens in the pre-announcement period. I
next use the success of activist campaigns, the long-term abnormal returns, and industry-adjusted
operating performance of the targets as alternative measures of engagement performance and nd
consistent positive results across each of these measures. Thus, my results indicate that having more
connections with other institutions has a signicantly positive impact on both the short-term and
long-term performance of activists’ targets.
As discussed above, having access to more information prior to choosing the target (information
gathering channel) and receiving support from other investors after choosing the target (support
channel) are the two main channels that could explain why connections improve activists’ perfor-
mance. However, distinguishing between these channels is an empirical challenge. To examine the
channels behind the results, I perform two sets of tests. First, I nd that an activist connected with
an institutional investor that had signicant ownership in a rm during the last three years but who
has already exited the rm (which I refer to as a "past" investor) is more likely to target that rm.
I also nd that having connections with past investors of a target increases the campaign’s success
rate. Because past investors are no longer shareholders of the target during the campaign, these two
results cannot be explained by the support channel and thus provide evidence for the information
gathering channel: information ows between activists and connected institutions allow activists
to choose targets with more potential for improvement. In the second set of tests, I provide evi-
dence for the support channel. I show that mutual funds are less likely to invest in an activist’s
target if they have lost their connections with that activist and that fewer mutual funds increase
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their ownership of targets of an activist that has lost its connections with part of the mutual fund
community. Consistent with the support channel, I also nd that well-connected activists run more
hostile campaigns.
I show that my results are inconsistent with other potential explanations and are robust to alter-
native denitions of networks and centrality. Using a hand-collected sample of passive investments
by hedge fund activists, I show that the eect of centrality on the market reaction to the activist’s
ling is signicantly weaker for passive investments than for activist campaigns by the same ac-
tivist: I do not nd that losing connections with mutual fund managers has any signicant eect
in passive investments. This nding rejects the argument that my results can be explained by the
market reaction to hedge funds’ trading skills. I also estimate the same eect in a pseudo activism
sample8 and reject the hypothesis that the eect of mutual fund manager turnovers simply captures
the correlation between the quality of substituted mutual fund managers and the quality of the
connected activist. In alternative specications, I weight connections based on the number of past
co-ownerships and percentage of ownership and nd that all results are robust to these alternative
measures.
This paper is related to three strands of literature. First, my paper contributes to the literature
showing eects of shareholder activism on short-term and long-term performance of target com-
panies.9 This literature also examines the role of coordination among institutional shareholders
(Artiga González and Calluzzo, 2016; Brav et al., 2016; Doidge et al., 2015; Crane et al., 2016) or the
rms’ response to such coordination (Boyson and Pichler, 2016).
Appel et al. (2016) show that the presence of passively managed mutual funds is associated with
increased use of hostile tactics and a higher likelihood of success by activists. My paper shows that
whether activists benet from behavior of other investors in a target is dependent on their prior
8I dene a pseudo activist engagement as a signicant increase in the ownership by a non-activist long-short equity
hedge fund randomly selected from the TASS database. See Section 6.3 for more details.
9E.g., see Gillan and Starks (2000),Gillan and Starks (2007), Brav et al. (2008), Cliord (2008), Greenwood and Schor
(2009), Klein and Zur (2009), Zur (2009), Brav et al. (2010), Bebchuk et al. (2015), Krishnan et al. (2015), and Foroughi
et al. (2016).
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connections to these investors, and shows that information ows (in particular, from actively man-
aged mutual funds to the activist) explain the outcomes of activist campaigns. In independent work,
He and Li (2016) consider connections of activists to mutual funds, but based on social ties rather
than past engagements. Their main focus is on the impact on the mutual fund investors’ investment
decisions and performance. Using connections based on prior investment behavior further allows
me to use mutual fund manager turnovers to identify the causal eect of connections and isolate
it from the eects of skill and reputation. Finally, dierent from all the papers described above,
which focus on the support channel, my paper also highlights the information gathering channel,
whereby coordination and connections with other investors allow the activist to pick targets with
greater potential for improvement.10
Outside the setting of hedge fund activism, connections between investors have been used more
broadly to explain the importance of information ows, and theoretical and empirical papers show
the eect of social networks on investors’ decisions (Ozsoylev and Walden, 2011; Walden, 2014; Oz-
soylev et al., 2014; Shiller and Pound, 1989; Cohen et al., 2008; Hong et al., 2005; Kelly and Gráda,
2000; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). My paper is also related to a large literature that uses measures
from SNA to explain rm or investor performance (for example, for venture capitalists (Hochberg
et al., 2007), investment banks (Bajo et al., 2016), boards of directors (Larcker et al., 2013), and CEOs
(El-Khatib et al., 2015)). Using exogenous shocks that break the connections between hedge fund
activists and mutual funds, my paper suggests a novel approach for identifying the eect of connec-
tivity in the investor network.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample and presents
descriptive statistics. In Section 3, I dene centrality measures and analyze the relation between
activists’ connectivity and performance. Section 4 introduces the empirical design, and Section 5
explains the identication strategy and establishes the causal eects of connectivity on activists’
10Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2017) also emphasize the role of institutions in hedge fund activism, but dierently
from my paper, they focus on the liquidity channel.
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short-run and long-run performance. Section 6 presents the robustness tests, and Section 7 con-
cludes.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This section describes the data collection process and presents descriptive statistics of the sample.
2.1. Activism Sample
The SEC requires any investor that acquires benecial ownership of more than 5% of any class
of publicly traded securities in a public company and is not a passive investor to le a Schedule 13D
and reveal information about the size and goals of its acquisition. I consider 13D lings by hedge
fund activists from 1994 to 2007 (I stop in 2007 so as not to include observations aected by the
nancial crisis).11
In the main tests, following studies that employ centrality measures from SNA, I use a ve-
year window to calculate centrality measures for each activist at the time of the announcement.
Therefore, the sample of activist engagements studied in the paper includes events between 1999
and 2007, while the 1994-2007 sample of engagements is used to construct centrality measures.
2.2. Passive Investments Sample
The SEC also requires any investor that acquires benecial ownership of more than 5% of any
class of publicly traded securities in a public company and is a passive investor to le a Schedule
13G and reveal information about the size of its acquisition. Using a web crawler program to read
through 13G lings, I collect 13G lings led by the same hedge fund activists as those in my activism
sample.12
11My sample is an extended version of the sample used in Brav et al. (2008). I thank Alon Brav for providing me with
these data.
12Generally, regulations of the required initial ling of 13G are dierent for three groups of investors: the rst
group ("passive" investors) are required to le within ten days after they pass the 5% threshold, while two other groups
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2.3.Ownership Data
As explained in the introduction and in Section 3 below, I use investment behavior of institu-
tional investors in activists’ targets around engagement announcements to construct the network
of connected investors. To identify changes in investors’ ownership in target rms, I rst collect
ownership data from the Thomson-Reuters 13F database. I then complete this sample by adding
information in related 13D and 13D amendment lings led by institutional investors around en-
gagement announcements, using a web crawler and a text-analysis program.13
2.4.Mutual Fund Manager Turnovers
As explained in more detail in Section 4, I use mutual fund manager turnovers as exogenous
shocks to activists’ connectivity. The data on manager turnovers come from Morningstar and CRSP.
Since only actively managed mutual funds can increase their ownership in activists’ targets due to
their connections to activists, I exclude index funds from the sample. Following Kostovetsky and
Warner (2015), I eliminate these funds by looking for the words “index”, “S&P”, “Dow Jones”, and
“NASDAQ” in the fund name and exclude all funds in the Dimensional Fund Advisors, Direxion,
Potomac, ProFund, and Ryder fund families.
I use the Thomson-Reuter Mutual Fund Holding database to track signicant changes in mu-
tual fund ownership around engagement announcements at the individual fund level. Because my
measure of network connections is based on ownership at the fund family level from the Thomson-
Reuter 13F database, I manually match the Mutual Fund Holding database to the Thomson-Reuter
13F database in order to understand which connections of the fund family were lost due to a spe-
("qualied" and "exempt" investors) are not required to le for a longer period, up to 45 days after the end of the next
nancial year. To identify ownership changes more precisely, I only keep the lings for the rst group of "passive"
investors. Since hedge fund activists are rarely considered as "qualied" and never as "exempt," this eliminates less than
3% of lings by activists.
13One of the challenges in building a network is to group investors in a proper way. Many individual shareholders
always le Schedule 13Ds and 13D amendments with a certain institutional investor. I group these investors with those
institutions.
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cic fund manager turnover.14 In the remainder of the paper, for simplicity, I refer to mutual fund
families as simply to funds. In robustness tests, I also used LinkedIn, Morningstar, Bloomberg, news
articles, and SEC lings by mutual funds to lter out turnovers in which managers kept their job as
a portfolio manager in the same fund or another fund (please see Section 6.6 for details).
2.5.Control Variables
Control variables for rm characteristics are derived from CRSP and Compustat. These variables
include Market Value, Growth rate, Cash Flow ratio, Leverage ratio, Cash ratio, R&D, Long-term
Debt ratio, Tobin’s Q, Book Value of Equity to Market Value of Equity, and the Amihud illiquidity
measure. Table A1 provides details on the construction of these variables. I obtain information about
activists’ size from the Lipper/TASS dataset. As the overlap between my sample and TASS is about
50%, I do not control for activists’ assets under management in the main tests and only control for
them in a robustness test (see Table A10).
2.6.Descriptive Statistics
The activism sample covers 1,449 activist engagements between 1999 and 2007. Depending on
the availability of other variables, the sample size in various regressions and in Table 1 can be smaller.
Panel A of Table 1 shows the summary statistics of rms targeted by activists. The average market
value and book to market ratio of a target in my sample are around $620 million and 0.91, respec-
tively. Panel B represents activist funds’ characteristics at the time of an engagement announcement.
It shows that on average an activist in my sample has launched about 18 engagements before the
current announcement and has $4.4 billion in assets under management, which means that activist
campaigns are run by experienced and large hedge funds. Finally, the summary statistics of outcome
variables in my sample are presented in Panel C. The average abnormal return around engagement
announcements is 6%, and the activist is successful in achieving its goals in 31% of engagements.
14I do it by comparing ownership at the family level and the fund level and verifying that the increase in ownership
at the family level is due to the increase in ownership of a specic fund in the family that experienced manager turnover.
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The denitions of all variables are provided in Table A1.
3 Centrality Measures and Baseline Results
Positive implications of social connections have been shown by many theoretical and empirical
papers. For example, portfolio decisions are related to managers’ connectivity and the information
they receive from close agents in their network (Kelly and Gráda, 2000; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001;
Cohen et al., 2008). On the other hand, network connectedness could also have negative implications
if social communication crowds out information production (Han and Yang, 2013) or if agents receive
signals that are positively correlated with their signals (Colla and Mele, 2010). Thus, it is not perfectly
clear whether connections would play a positive or negative role in shareholder activism. The goal
of my paper is to answer this question by building centrality measures of shareholder activists in
the institutional investor network.
In this section, I explain the construction of centrality measures and provide preliminary results
on the association between network centrality and the abnormal return around activism announce-
ments.
3.1.Measures Characterizing Hedge Fund Activists’ Network
To study the eect of the activists’ network position, it is necessary to construct the variables
that capture and quantify it. Social Network Analysis (SNA) provides a set-up that allows me to
measure activists’ centrality using their connections (based on co-ownership in targets) with other
institutional investors.
Similar to other studies that investigate the eect of connectivity on agents’ performance, I go
through three steps to construct centrality measures. The rst step is to dene a connection between
two investors. Figure 1 presents the graphical illustration of this denition. At a given point in time
t, I dene two investors as connected if they have co-invested in at least one activist’s campaign over
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the last ve years, i.e., in the (t-5, t) period. More specically, for any activist’s campaign that took
place over the last ve years (e.g., the campaign of activist hedge fund 3 in Figure 1), I consider all
investors that have increased their ownership in the activist’s target by at least 1 percentage point
over the six-month period around the announcement of the campaign (e.g., fund 1 and fund 2 in
Figure 1).15
I then dene such investors as being connected to the activist as well as connected to each
other. For example, Figure 1 implies that activist fund 3 is connected to both fund 1 and fund 2,
and that funds 1 and 2 are connected to each other. I then aggregate such links across all activist
campaigns over the (t-5, t) period, which gives me the network of connections as of time t. I focus
on the 5-year period following Hochberg et al. (2007); Bajo et al. (2016), and consider a 3-year period
in robustness tests in Table A8. In the next two steps, I build centrality measures based on this
dynamically changing network. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the investor network over time.
After storing all of the links between institutional shareholders, I build an adjacency matrix (this
matrix is also dynamic and constructed at the time of each campaign announcement). Each cell
of the matrix takes a value of one (xij = 1) if there is a connection between the two institutional
investors (Fund i and Fund j) and a value of zero otherwise. In my analysis, I do not consider the
direction of connections between two institutional shareholders, so this matrix is symmetric, and
the centrality measures are calculated based on undirected networks. Several measures have been
associated with the position of a nancial agent in a network. I use the two most frequently used
centrality measures in the nance and economics literature: Degree and Eigenvector.
Degree Centrality
Degree is the simplest measure among other centrality measures that capture the number and
15In robustness tests, I dene a signicant increase in ownership as an increase of at least 2 percentage points and
show similar results (see Table A9). In addition, in robustness tests, I dene the network based on increases in ownership
that occurred in the three-month period before the announcement, i.e., excluding increases in ownership that occurred
after the announcement (Please see Section 6.3 for more details).
12
the quality of connections that each agent has with other players in a network. In the context
of nancial investments, an institutional investor is well-connected if it has more connections to
other shareholders. Therefore, if xij indicates the link between Fund i and Fund j from the matrix








whereNi is the set of all investors except for investor i and
∑
j∈Ni xij measures the total number of
connections between investor i and other investors. Because I compare the network positions of an
activist at dierent times and the network size is dynamic, I normalize this measure by the network
size minus one. Thus, the degree centrality measure in the above formula captures the percentage
of the network to which each activist fund is connected.
Eigenvector Centrality
Having direct connections with other agents in a network is more important when these con-
nections are inuential. I use the popular form of Eigenvector centrality measure introduced in
Bonacich (1972). It incorporates the importance of each relationship in the nal value of connected-
ness. As shown in the following equation, Eigenvector centrality values an agent as well-connected





where λ shows the coecient (equal to the largest Eigenvalue) that makes the equations system
solvable and Eigenvectorit denotes the total number of connections between investor i and other
investors weighted by other investors’ Eigenvector values at time t. In the context of activism
investments, a high Eigenvector score means that a fund is connected to central funds in a network
and may be able to extract or circulate information more eciently.
13
3.2. Summary Statistics of Centrality Measures
Panel A of Table 2 shows that, on average, a hedge fund activist in my sample is connected to
9% of investors in the activism network. However, the average Eigenvector is 3%, which means
that an activist in my sample is only connected to 3% of the network if I use connections weighted
by the importance of investors. Similar to other papers that study social networks in nance, the
distribution of centrality measures is skewed to the right. The median activist’s Degree centrality
is 4%, and a one standard deviation increase in the Degree centrality moves an activist from the
rst percentile of the sample to the top quartile of the sample. The same pattern is seen for the
Eigenvector centrality. In Panel B, I compare characteristics of rms targeted by central activists
and characteristics of those targeted by peripheral activists. Numbers in panel B are in line with
the hypothesis that central and peripheral activists target dierent types of rms. As shown in this
table, central activists in my sample choose larger and more liquid rms as their targets.
There are several ways to weigh the connections among shareholders. In the main regressions,
I use simple weighted centrality measures as dened above. To check the robustness of my results,
I repeat all the tests with centrality measures weighted by the number of connections between
investors and by the increase in the percentage of ownership around the engagements. These results
are consistent with the main results and are presented in Tables A2 and A7 in the Appendix. In the
following section, I normalize centrality measures by their mean and standard deviation to make
the interpretation of presented results simpler.
3.3.Baseline Results: Activist’s Centrality and Announcement Return
To test the relation between the network position and activism performance, I estimate the
following regression:
(3)CARijt = β1Centrality Measureit + ρZt + θi + γt + λIndj + σijt
where Centrality Measure is a normalized variable that captures the position of activist i in the
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investor network before the announcement of targeting rm j in year t. θi, γt and λIndj capture
the activist fund-xed eect, year xed-eect, and industry xed-eect, respectively. Dependent
variables in this regression are abnormal returns around engagement announcements (CAR (-20,
+20) and CAR (-10, +10). Zt stands for a vector of target characteristics, activist characteristics, and
campaign characteristics. Target-specic variables are calculated based on the target rm’s nancial
information in the year before the announcement and are the same as the ones explained in Section
3. Activist and campaign characteristics are calculated at the time of the announcement.
Another variable that might explain the activist’s performance is the experience of the lead ac-
tivist. Boyson et al. (2016) document that experienced activists receive a better reaction from the
market around announcements compared to newcomers. I control for the activist’s experience by
including the number of prior engagements as a control variable. Finally, I control for the purpose
of activist engagements, revealed in item 4 of Schedule 13D, in all tests of this section.
Results in Table 3 show that a one standard deviation in centrality is associated with a 3% increase
in the abnormal return in the twenty-day window around an announcement (CAR (-20, +20)) and a
2.5% increase in the abnormal return in the ten-day window around an announcement (CAR (-10,
+10)). In unreported tests, I show that results stay both economically and statistically signicant if
activist xed-eects are not included in the regressions.
The size of an activist might be related to both the performance of an engagement and its network
position. For example, Krishnan et al. (2015) show that the average size of previous investments
explains the abnormal return around the announcements. However, as explained in the data section,
I do not have the activist’s size for all observations in my sample, so I only control for size in the
robustness tests. The results of these regressions are presented in Table A10 in the Appendix and
show a similar association between centrality measures and the announcement return.
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4 Empirical Design
The goal of this paper is to establish a causal eect of activist funds’ connectedness on their per-
formance. While the results in Section 3.3 show a strong positive association between an activist’s
centrality and the market reaction to the announcement of its campaign, this association is not nec-
essarily causal because centrality in the network is not exogenous and can be associated with other
activist’s characteristics such as skill, reputation, or media coverage. For example, more reputable
activists or activists that are more skilled in making changes to their targets or in picking the tar-
gets could be followed more by other investors and thus become more central in the network as
time passes. Prior literature (Zur, 2009; Krishnan et al., 2015) shows a positive relation between the
abnormal returns upon the announcement of a campaign and dierent proxies for the activist’s rep-
utation, so it is important to distinguish the eect of connections with other investors from other
alternative explanations for superior performance.
To identify the eect of connections, I employ an exogenous shock to the network of activist
funds using the turnover of mutual fund managers. Many studies in the prior literature suggest
that social ties partially explain the trading behavior and portfolio allocations of asset managers,
including both mutual funds and hedge funds (Shiller and Pound, 1989; Cohen et al., 2008; Pareek,
2012; Gerritzen et al., 2016). Because activist investors are likely to establish connections with spe-
cic fund managers, the turnover of such managers could result in the loss of connections for an
activist. At the same time, since activists’ targets constitute less than 1% of mutual fund portfolios,
turnover of mutual fund managers is likely to be exogenous in that it is unrelated to the activist’s
performance. In Section 6.3, I conduct a placebo test to further alleviate the concern that fund man-
ager turnovers may not be exogenous. Therefore, showing that such turnover negatively aects the
activist’s campaigns can help establish a causal eect of connections on the activist’s performance
and rule out alternative explanations.
In the remainder of this section, I rst verify that turnover of mutual fund managers indeed af-
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fects funds’ relationships with activists, and then describe the empirical design based on managerial
turnover that I use to establish the causal eect of connections. Then, in Section 5, I apply this design
to derive my main results about the role of connections for short-run and long-run performance of
the campaigns and the channels behind this eect.
4.1.Losing Connections and Funds’ Investments
To justify the use of mutual fund manager turnovers as shocks to activists’ connections, I start
by showing that these turnovers have a signicant impact on both the activist’s engagements and on
mutual funds’ investment strategy. In particular, I provide evidence that 1) rms owned by investors
connected to an activist are more likely to be targeted by that activist, and 2) mutual funds increase
their ownership in rms that are targeted by an activist to which they are connected.
To show these results, I rst dene a connection between an activist and a mutual fund as being
partially "lost" if the mutual fund experienced managerial turnover since the time when the con-
nection was established. This denition is illustrated in Figure 2. In particular, suppose that activist
fund 3’s campaign in target B is announced at time t, and suppose that mutual fund 2 signicantly
increased its ownership in one of the activist’s targets over the last ve years, so that x23 = 1.
Suppose that the last co-investment of the mutual fund in the activist’s targets (target A in Figure
2) occurred at time tˆ during the (t-5, t) period. Then, I dene the connection between the activist
and the mutual fund as being partially "lost" at time t if the mutual fund experienced managerial
turnover during the (tˆ, t) period. More specically, I dene the percentage loss in connections be-
tween the activist and the mutual fund at time t as the percentage of managers in the mutual fund
that worked at the fund at time tˆ but no longer work in the fund at time t.
Targeting Firms Owned by Connected Investors
To show that connections lost due to mutual fund manager turnovers aect the likelihood of the
rm being targeted by the activist, I consider a sample that includes both rms targeted by activists
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and, as control rms, rms in the same industry and in the same ve by ve portfolio formed on
size and book-to-market as activists’ targets. I use the following regression:
(4)
Targetijt =β1Connection Dummyijt + β2Connection Dummyijt × Lost Connectionsijt+
ρZt + θFirmsjt + γt + λIndj + σijt
where Targetijt is a dummy variable with a value of one if rm j is targeted by activist i at time
t. Connection Dummyijt is a dummy variable that captures the connection (as dened in Sec-
tion 3.1) between the activist and investors that had signicant ownership (greater than 1%) in rm
j at some point over the three year period before the activism announcement or the three month
period after the announcement. The key variable is Lost Connectionsijt, which is equal to the
percentage of connections between the activist and past and current signicant investors of the
target that are lost due to manager turnovers at those investors, where lost connections are de-
ned above. This specication corresponds to the rst two columns in Panel A of Table 4. These
regressions show that being connected to an activist through large shareholders increases the like-
lihood of a rm being an activist’s target by 8.2 percentage points. However, the coecient on
Connection Dummy × Lost Connections is negative with a similar magnitude as the coef-
cient on the Connection variable, which means that having a connection with another nancial
institution matters only if the institution still has the same managers as the ones at the time when
the connection (co-investment in a target) last occurred.
In the last two columns in Panel A of Table 4, I replace the variables Connection Dummyijt
and Lost Connectionsijt by PIConnection Dummyijt and Lost PIConnectionsijt ("Past
Investor Connection Dummy" and "Lost Past Investor Connections") to focus only on past owners
of the rm, those that had signicant ownership in the target at some point over the three year period
before the activism announcement but exited the target before the announcement. As explained in
Section 5.2 below, I will later use these regressions to explore the channels behind the eects and
identify the information-gathering channel.
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Investing in Firms Targeted by a Connected Activist
The following regression tests the eect of connections between major shareholders and a hedge
fund activist on the investment decisions of connected investors.
(5)
Connected Ownershipijkt =β1Connectionikt + β2Connectionikt × Lost Connectionsikt
+ ρZt + θi + γt + λIndj + σijkt
where Connected Ownershipikt is the change in the ownership of connected investor k in
rm j targeted by activist i over a three-month period around the announcement of the campaign at
time t. I use two dierent measures of Connected Ownership: one ("Percentage Change") looks
at the percentage point change in the ownership of connected investors, and the other ("Change
Dummy") is a dummy variable equal to one if the connected investor increases its ownership.
Connectionikt is a dummy variable equal to one if investor k is connected to activist i.
Lost Connectionsikt is equal to the percentage of connections between activist i and fund k that
is lost due to manager turnovers at fund k. The sample I use to run this test includes all rms
in the portfolios of investors connected to hedge fund activists, including both targeted and non-
targeted rms. Panel B in Table 4 shows that mutual funds are more likely to invest or increase their
ownership in rms that are targeted by a connected activist. On average, the likelihood of increasing
ownership is by 8.6 percentage points higher when there is a connection between that investor and
the activist hedge fund. Importantly, similar to Panel A, the coecient on the interaction term with
lost connections is negative with a similar magnitude, implying that the result is not signicant
when the connection was lost due to fund manager turnover.
Overall, these results verify that lost connections due to fund manager turnover are important
both for activists’ and mutual funds’ investment decisions. I next introduce identication variables
that allow me to use manager turnovers as shocks to activists’ centrality.
4.2.Identication Variables
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Suppose activist i has a connection with mutual fund j at time t (xijt = 1), and the last co-
investment of fund j in the activist’s targets over the (t-5, t) period occurred at time tˆ. Following
the previously introduced denition, dene γjt as the percentage number of managers who worked
at fund j at time tˆ but no longer work in the fund at time t. Then, Lost Degreeit denotes the









Similarly, to determine the importance of lost connections, I dene the variableLost Eigenvectorit
that calculates the percentage change in Eigenvector score after excluding the connections with mu-








4.3. Summary Statistics of Connection Loss
The number of observations in which the hedge fund activist experienced a connection loss due
to mutual fund manager turnovers is 368, which constitutes 25.4% of the sample. Panel A of Table
5 shows that in the subsample of hedge funds that have experienced a loss in their connections due
to mutual fund manager turnovers, the average number of connections that an activist loses is one.
This corresponds to a 1.4% decrease in Degree centrality and a 4.55% decrease in Eigenvector cen-
trality. The average loss in connections with mutual funds rises to 13.78% for Eigenvector centrality
if connections are weighted by investors’ percentage of ownership in activists’ targets. Therefore,
losing connections with mutual funds becomes even more important when positions of these mu-
tual funds and their participation in activists’ engagements are incorporated in the calculation of
centrality measures (I use these measures in robustness tests).
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In Panel B, I compare characteristics of the rms targeted by activists that have lost connections
with mutual funds and those targeted by activists not aected by turnovers in mutual funds. The
comparison shows that there are signicant dierences between the rst group and the second group
regarding size, R&D, Cash Flow, Book to Market Ratio, and liquidity. These numbers are in line with
the hypothesis that losing connections aects the activist’s choice of targets.
To make the interpretation of the results simpler, I normalize the centrality measures and the
loss in centrality measures by their mean and standard deviation. The key independent variable in
the main results, presented in Section 5, is the change in the simple weighted centrality measures
based on mutual fund manager turnovers.
5 Eects of Losing Connections on Activist Campaigns
This section presents the main results of the paper. In Section 5.1, I analyze the eects of losing
connections with other investors on the short-term and long-term campaign performance using the
identication variables introduced in Section 4 as the main independent variables. In Section 5.2, I
examine the channels that explain these eects.
5.1.Campaign Performance
5.1.1.Announcement Return
To test whether losing connections due to mutual fund manager turnovers is associated with
a lower abnormal return, I rst provide graphical evidence in Figure 4. It presents the buy and
hold abnormal return around activist engagement announcements for activists who experienced
a loss in connections due to mutual fund manager turnovers (dashed line) and those that did not
(solid line). The gure shows that activists with lost connections experience a signicantly lower
market reaction to the announcement of their campaigns than those without lost connections. The
bottom gure is similar to the top gure but visually separates the announcement return into the
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pre-announcement and post-announcement parts to show that most of the eect occurs in the pre-
announcement period.
To verify these results more formally, I estimate the following regression in Table 6:
(8)
CARijt =β1Percentage of Lost Centralityit
+ ρZt + θi + γt + λIndj + σijt
Percentage of Lost Centralityit is either Lost Degreeit or Lost Eigenvectorit and de-
scribes the percentage of activists’ connections that is lost due to manager turnovers in mutual funds.
The remaining variables are the same as those explained in Section 3.
Coecients on the key independent variable show that a one standard deviation increase in
lost connections is associated with a 2.5% decrease in the abnormal return in a twenty-day window
around the announcement (CAR (-20, +20)) and a 1.8% decrease in abnormal return in a ten-day
window around the announcement (CAR (-10, +10)). Moreover, as models (5)-(8) show, most of
this eect is coming from the pre-announcement period. These results conrm my ndings in the
previous section and suggest that the eect of connections on the announcement return is likely to
be causal.
5.1.2.Long-term Performance
I next use alternative measures of performance to show that connections with other investors
also positively aect the long-term (stock and operating) performance of activists’ targets and the
success rate of their campaigns. To examine the long-term eects of connection loss on activist
campaigns, I test the following regression:
(9)
Long− Term Performanceij =β1Percentage of Lost Centralityit × 1t+1
+ β2Percentage of Lost Centralityit × 1t+2
+ β3Percentage of Lost Centralityit × 1t+3
+ ρZt + Year Dummies+ ηj + γt + θi + λIndj + σijt
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where 1t+1, 1t+2, and 1t+3 are dummy variables that represent the rst year after an announce-
ment, the second year after an announcement, and the third year after an announcement, respec-
tively. Results in Table 7 provide evidence that losing connections is associated with both a less
positive long-term return and less positive changes in operating performance (ROA).
In Table 8, I show that a one standard deviation loss in the connections of an activist results
in a 3.8% decrease in the likelihood of being successful, where a campaign is dened as successful
if the activist either achieved the goals stated in the 13D ling or settled with management. The
results are both economically and statistically more signicant when I test the incremental eect of
connection loss on the campaign’s success rate in the subsample of hostile engagements. Overall, my
results establish a positive and signicant eect of connections on both the short-run and long-run
performance of activist campaigns.
5.2.Channels of the Eect
As discussed in the introduction, the two likely channels that explain the positive eect of
connections is that connections (1) help activists pick better targets for intervention (information-
gathering channel) and (2) allow them to get higher support in their campaigns (support channel).
One other possible channel is that connections with other investors help the activist identify prof-
itable trading opportunities more generally, rather than protable targets for intervention per se.
In this section, I rst rule out this third possible channel ("trading skills" channel) and then provide
evidence in favor of the rst two channels.
5.2.1.Trading Skills
To rule out the hypothesis that better short-term performance of central activists is due to
their superior trading skills (unrelated to activism) that come from connections to other investors,
I investigate the dierence between the eect of losing connections for active engagements (13D
lings) and passive engagements (13G lings). I estimate the following regression in the sample of
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both active and passive engagements and present the results in Table 9.
(10)
CARijt =β1Percentage of Lost Centralityit+
β2Percentage of Lost Centralityit × 13D Dummyijt
+ 13D Dummyijt + ρZt + θi + γt + λIndj + σijt
The coecient on Percentage of Lost Centralityit is insignicant and the coecient on
the interaction term is negative and signicant, which shows that losing connections aects the
announcement return around the activist’s ling only when the activist has an activism intention.
These ndings are inconsistent with the "trading skills" hypothesis.
In addition, following (Brav et al. (2008)), I look at the market reaction to engagement announce-
ments for which the activist’s ownership in the target has already been revealed through the ac-
tivist’s 13F ling. The idea is that if the market reaction to the activist’s campaign is due to the
inference that the rm may be undervalued per se, rather than the anticipation that the activist will
improve the rm, then such reaction will be more muted if the activist’s ownership has already been
revealed. Coecients in Table A11 in the Appendix show that the market is more enthusiastic about
activism announcements by more central activists even if the activist’s ownership information has
already been revealed through the 13F ling.
5.2.2.Obtaining Information about Potential Targets
One of the ways that an activist might benet from having connections with other investors is
obtaining useful information before picking a target about which targets present the best opportu-
nities for intervention. To distinguish this information-gathering channel from the support channel,
I dene a "past" investor as an investor that had signicant ownership (greater than 1%) in the rm
at some point over the three year period before the activism announcement but exited the rm be-
fore the announcement. In Section 4, panel A of Table 4, columns (3)-(4), I show that a connection
between an activist and one of the past investors of a rm increases the activist’s propensity to
target that rm. Because these past investors have already exited the target, this eect cannot be
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explained by the anticipated higher support from connected investors. In a similar vein, in Table
10, I show that having a connection with one of the target’s past investors helps the activist run a
more successful campaign: such connections positively aect both the announcement return and
the success of the campaign. The coecient on the interaction term shows that if an activist loses
its connection with a past investor because of manager turnover at a connected mutual fund, the
eect is insignicant, suggesting that the eect of connections is causal.
Together, these results back the information-gathering channel, whereby private communication
between activists and connected investors helps the activist pick better targets for its campaigns.
5.2.3.Receiving Support from Other Investors
Other Investors’ Ownership
In this section, I provide evidence that central activists are followed by more investors in their
engagements. Because investors that increase their ownership in the target around the campaign
announcement are likely to support the activist in its engagement, these results are consistent with
the support channel. I estimate the following regression model in Table 11:
(11)
Other Investorsijt =β1Centrality Measureit + β2Percentage of Lost Networkit
+ ρZt + θi + γt + λIndj + σijt
where Other Investorsijt captures dierent aspects of other investors’ involvement in activist i’s
campaign in rm j at time t, such as the number of investors who invest or signicantly increase
their ownership in the target shortly before or shortly after the announcement of the campaign
For example, the last two columns of Table 11 indicate that a one standard deviation increase in
lost connections is associated with 0.77 fewer investors that increase their ownership signicantly
around the activism announcement, and this number is 0.32 for investors that have invested in at
least one of the activist’s previous engagements. In a similar vein, results in Table 12 show that
activists that have lost connections with mutual funds are attracted to rms with less mutual fund
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ownership and that mutual funds increase their ownership less after the announcement by these
activists.
Engagements Features
Another way to show that more central activists enjoy stronger support from other sharehold-
ers is to examine the eect of connection loss on both the purposes and tactics of the engagements.
Table 13 shows that a one standard deviation increase in connection loss is associated with a 14.2
percentage point decrease in the likelihood of the activist choosing a hostile tactic, where a tactic is
dened as hostile if the activist starts a proxy ght or threatens the management with launching a
proxy ght. The fact that the eect is slightly smaller on the initial tactic (at the time of the campaign
announcement) suggests that activists are likely to change their tone after receiving more support
from other shareholders. Table 14 shows that a one standard deviation increase in connection loss
measured by Degree centrality is associated with a 3.4 percentage point higher probability of not
choosing a specic purpose for the engagement and that an activist that experiences a loss in con-
nections is less likely to choose business strategy and capital structure related goals. The results are
in the same direction but insignicant if I use Eigenvector centrality measures.
6 Robustness Tests
6.1.Connection Loss and Percentage of Ownership
One of the counter arguments that might explain my results is based on the size of ownership
by the activist. If central activists acquire smaller stakes in their targets than peripheral activists,
the market could be more surprised by the announcement of their campaigns, leading to a stronger
market reaction around the announcements. Results in Table A2 reject this hypothesis by showing
that the eect of centrality on the activist’s ownership in the target is positive, rather than nega-
tive, and is not economically signicant. In unreported results, I also repeat the main tests after
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controlling for the activist’s ownership in the target and show that the results are not aected.
6.2.Dierent Denitions of Connections
It is important to show that my results do not depend on the way that I dene connections among
investors. Therefore, I build the same centrality measures as before but based on the networks in
which links are weighted by the number of connections between investors and the average increase
in the percentage of ownership of investors around the engagements. In particular, if two investors
invest in the same activism targets repeatedly, the link between them is stronger compared to the
relationship between two investors that invest in the same target just once. The link could also be
stronger if they acquire a larger number of shares in activism targets, i.e., two block holders are
more connected to each other than two shareholders with only a few shares.
In Tables A4 and A7 in the Appendix, I replicate the main results in this paper using centrality
measures calculated based on percentage weighted connections and number weighted connections.
The results of the tests with number weighted and percentage weighted centrality measures are
more signicant both economically and statistically.
6.3.Connections Based on the Pre-announcement Period
My main measure of connections is based on signicant increases in target ownership in the
six-month period around the engagement announcement. However, if an activist has established a
reputation for running successful campaigns, then some institutions may increase their ownership
in the activist’s target after the public announcement of a new campaign, even if they do not have a
connection to that activist. To address the concern that some post-announcement investments could
be coming from non-connected institutions, I redene connections by focusing only on increases
in target ownership that occurred in the three-month period before the announcement. Since these
investments were made before any public revelation about the activist’s campaign, it is very likely
that they came from connected institutions, who got tips from the activist about the upcoming
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campaign. I then redene my measures of centrality using the new denition of connections. Tables
A12 and A13 show that the coecients of the main variables stay signicant both economically and
statistically if I use this alternative denition of connections and network centrality.
6.4.Pseudo Activism Engagements
One alternative explanation for the positive eect of connections on the announcement returns
is based on the type of investors that buy targets at a similar point in time. It could be that investors
who co-invest in the same targets simply follow the same trading strategies. In this case, mutual fund
manager turnover in connected investors could reduce the number of investors trading in the same
direction as the activist, resulting in a lower abnormal return around the campaign announcement.
Another potential counterargument for the use of mutual fund manager turnovers as exogenous
shocks to activists’ connections is the correlation between the quality of the activist and the quality
of mutual fund managers connected to the activist. If activists of poor quality are more likely to be
connected to mutual fund managers with poor performance, such activists are more likely to expe-
rience a loss in connections due to fund manager turnover. Thus, the negative eect of connection
loss on the activist’s performance could reect the poor quality of the activist, rather than the eect
of connections per se.
One way to reject both of these counterarguments is to test similar eects in a non-activism sam-
ple. If the association between centrality in the investor network and performance exists regardless
of the investment type, then I should nd similar results for hedge funds buying shares without any
activism agenda. I, therefore, perform a placebo test by constructing a "pseudo activism" sample
using the data on long-short equity hedge funds from Lipper/TASS. I dene a "pseudo activism" en-
gagement as the situation when a long-short equity hedge fund signicantly increases its holdings
of a stock (between 3 and 5 percentage points). I require two conditions in constructing this sample.
First, it should be the rst time that the market knows about a signicant change in the hedge fund’s
portfolio, and second, it should not end in an activist campaign or involve another activist.
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In the next step, I create centrality measures and identication variables in the same way that I
build them for the main sample. Table A5 presents results of this section, where the sample includes
both the activism sample and the pseudo-activism sample. These results indicate that the eect of
connections on the target’s short-run performance is signicant only when a hedge fund is running
an activist campaign, but not for the pseudo sample, refuting the two alternative explanations.
6.5.Dierent Denitions of the Identication Variable
In this section, I show that my results remain robust if I use the identication variables dened
dierently from the way I describe in section 3. I use the level of lost connections instead of the
percentage and show that results of the connection loss continue to hold. These results are more
signicant when I control for the level of the activist’s centrality (see Table A6). Finally, in Table
A14, I show that the results are robust if I use the ratio of the number of manager turnovers to the
total number of managers involved in each connection to calculate the connection loss.
6.6.Filtered Turnover Sample
Fund managers experience dierent roles through their careers, and many of them work for
more than one fund or dierent nancial institutions as a portfolio manager. Therefore, hedge fund
activists might keep their connection with the fund family if that manager stay as a portfolio man-
ager in the mutual fund family or they might form a connection with a new institution if the fund
manager takes a position in another fund family. To tackle this issue, I manually collect information
on the career development of fund managers who increased the fund ownership in an activist’s tar-
get around the campaign announcement and left the fund during ve years after that campaign. I
use four sources to track mutual fund managers after they leave the mutual fund. The rst source
is managers’ Linkedin accounts. If they do not have an account, I check Morningstar database on
mutual fund managers and Bloomberg website to nd their employment records. Finally, I check
the news articles and SEC lings by the mutual funds around the time of the turnover. The initial
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sample of manager turnovers consists of 531 turnovers between 1994 and 2007. I categorize these
turnovers into six dierent groups. The rst group includes 292 manager turnovers in which man-
agers resigned, joined a small fund, acceded to another fund with a dierent style of investment
or under a dierent title, or I could not track the manager after her turnover. The second group
consists of 62 turnovers in which managers retired or died. The third group includes 19 turnovers
in which the manager stayed in the same family but not as a portfolio manager. The 93 manager
turnovers in which the manager stayed in the same family as a portfolio manager or joined another
fund as a portfolio manager shape the fourth group. Finally, I put 65 turnovers for which I could not
nd the manager in the mentioned databases in the fth group. I ltered out the fourth group from
the sample to make sure that the turnover disconnects the link between the activist and the mutual
fund. Table A15 shows that for the ltered subsample of turnovers, the engagement announcement
eects are stronger (both economically and statistically) than for the unltered subsample. 16
7 Conclusion
Hedge fund activism has emerged as a prominent and powerful force in corporate governance. Other
types of institutional investors have started working along with shareholder activists and support-
ing them during their campaigns. In this paper, I focus on the role of non-activist investors in
activist engagements and in particular, analyze the eect of built connections among investors on
future engagements. Employing centrality measures from the Social Network Analysis, I nd that
activists that are more central in the investor network experience both a higher market reaction
to announcements of their engagements and better long-run performance of their targets. To rule
out alternative explanations for the positive relation between the success of activist campaigns and
centrality measures, I use mutual fund manager turnovers as exogenous shocks to the activists’ net-
16I also repeat the tests on the long-term eects of campaigns and nd similar magnitudes. Finally, I also test the
main results excluding the turnovers for which I could not nd the managers and nd similar results.
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work connections. I nd that activist investors that have experienced a loss in their connections
due to mutual fund manager turnovers receive less positive reaction from the market around their
activist campaign announcements and experience a smaller abnormal return during the rst year
after the announcement. I also nd that these activists are, on average, less successful in achieving
their goals and improving the operating performance of their targets. My analysis provides sup-
port for two likely mechanisms that explain these results: gathering information prior to targeting
a rm and receiving support from other investors when running an activist campaign. In particular,
consistent with the information-gathering channel, I show that if an activist has a relationship with
one of the past block holders of that company, its propensity to target a rm increases and it is
more likely to run a successful campaign. Consistent with the support channel, I show that well-
connected activist hedge funds are followed by more institutional investors after the announcement
and are more likely to choose a hostile tactic for their campaigns. Overall, these ndings emphasize
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Figure 1: Time Line for Connections
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Figure 2: Time Line for Connection Loss
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Figure 4: Buy and Hold Abnormal Return around announcements: Activists that have experienced
connection loss vs. other activists
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Table 1: General Descriptive Statistics
The sample consists of hedge fund activist engagements announced between 1999 and 2007. Market Value
is dened as market capitalization in millions of dollars. Growth is equal to the growth rate of sales over
the last year to the activist engagement announcement. Cash Flow is dened as (net income + depreciation
and amortization)/lagged assets. Leverage Ratio is the book leverage ratio dened as debt/(debt + book value
of equity). Cash Ratio is equal to (cash + cash equivalents)/assets. R&D ratio is calculated by dividing R&D
expenses in COMPUSTAT by lagged asset value. Long-Term Debt is dened as long-term debt over market value
of assets. Tobin’s Q is equal to (book value of debt + market value of equity)/(book value of debt + book value of
equity). Book to Market Ratio is (book value of equity/market value of equity). Amihud is dened as the yearly
average of
√
(1000|Return|/(DollarTradingVolume)). No. of Past Engagements captures the number of
previous activist engagements announced by a hedge fund activist in the sample. Last Announcement Return
is equal to abnormal market reaction (CAR(-20,+20)) to the previous engagement announced by the activist.
Activist’s Size capture the value of the asset under management in the TASS database. CAR(-20,+20) is equal
to the abnormal market reaction to engagement announcement, which is computed over the window (-20,+20).
CAR(-10,+10) is equal to the abnormal market reaction to engagement announcement, which is computed over
the window (-10,+10). Specic Purpose is a dummy variable that identies whether an activist mentions any
goal in item 4 of the 13D ling. Hostile Tactic is a dummy variable that identies whether an activist uses
hostile tactics to achieve its goals. Success Dummy is a dummy variable that identies whether an activist has
been successful in achieving its goals.
Panel A: Control Variables
Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th S.D. N
Ln(Market Value) 5.23 3.08 4.00 5.20 6.44 7.48 1.66 1,104
Growth 0.14 -0.19 -0.04 0.06 0.19 0.47 0.50 1,104
Cash Flow 0.01 -0.20 -0.02 0.05 0.12 0.20 0.25 1,104
Leverage Ratio 0.31 0.00 0.01 0.27 0.53 0.71 0.28 1,104
Cash Ratio 0.20 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.30 0.55 0.22 1,104
R&D Ratio 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.16 0.11 1,104
Long-term Debt 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.34 0.57 0.23 1,104
Tobin’s Q 1.89 0.77 1.03 1.41 2.20 3.44 1.53 1,104
Book to Market Ratio 0.91 0.20 0.36 0.60 0.95 1.59 1.35 1,104
Amihud 0.40 0.03 0.06 0.18 0.55 1.15 0.49 1,104
Panel B: Hedge Fund Activist Characteristics
Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th S.D. N
No. of Past Engagements 17.88 1.00 2.00 6.00 16.00 49.00 31.70 1,240
Last Announcement Return 0.04 -0.14 -0.03 0.00 0.11 0.27 0.19 1,240
Activist’s Size (Billion Dollar) 4.42 0.16 0.42 1.23 4.80 15.77 7.09 764
Panel C: Hedge Fund Activism Characteristics and Outcome Variables
Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th S.D. N
CAR(-20,+20) 0.06 -0.17 -0.07 0.04 0.15 0.30 0.22 1,196
CAR(-10,+10) 0.06 -0.10 -0.03 0.04 0.12 0.24 0.16 1,196
Specic Purpose 0.51 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1,196
Hostile Tactic 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.44 1,196
Hostile Initial Tactic 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.34 1,196
Success Dummy 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.46 1,196
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics-Centrality Measures
The sample consists of hedge fund activist engagements announced between 1999 and 2007. Panel A shows character-
istics of the investor network built out of connections based on co-ownership of institutional shareholders that trade
actively around activist engagements in a ve-year window prior to an activist engagement. No. of Connections is equal
to the number of other investors that are connected to an activist prior to its current engagement. Investor Network
Size indicates the total number of investors in the network before an engagement announcement in the sample. Degree
variable captures the percentage of the investor population that are connected to an activist before the announcement.
Degree Number Weighted and Degree Percentage Weighted are similar to Degree, with connections weighted by the num-
ber of co-ownerships in dierent targets by two investors in the network and average size of the ownership in dierent
targets by two investors in the network, respectively. Eigen Vector captures the importance of an activist in the network
at the time of announcement, weighing connections by the importance of connected investors.
Panel A: Investor Network Characteristics
Mean 50th S.D. N
No. of Connections 64.18 32.00 78.41 1,449
Investor Network Size 766.16 645.00 292.23 1,449
Degree 0.09 0.04 0.12 1,449
Degree Number Weighted 0.14 0.05 0.22 1,449
Degree Percentage Weighted 0.78 0.33 1.15 1,449
Eigen Vector 0.03 0.02 0.04 1,449
Eigen Vector Number Weighted 0.04 0.01 0.06 1,449
Eigen Vector Percentage Weighted 0.02 0.01 0.04 1,449
Panel B: Target Firms’ Characteristics and Centrality Measures
Target Firms’ Characteristics Eigenvector 4th Q Eigenvector 1st Q Dierence
Ln(Market Value) 5.807∗∗∗ 4.240∗∗∗ 1.567∗∗∗
Growth 0.131∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ -0.055
Cash Flow 0.025∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
Leverage Ratio 0.344∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗
Cash Ratio 0.179∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗
R&D Ratio 0.047∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗
Long-term Debt 0.210∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗
Tobin’s Q 1.970∗∗∗ 1.927∗∗∗ 0.043
Book to Market Ratio 0.811∗∗∗ 1.112∗∗∗ -0.301∗∗∗
Amihud 0.265∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ -0.320∗∗∗
No. of Observations 362 363
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Table 3: Activists’ Centrality and Announcements Return
The dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns around activism announcements. The
sample consists of hedge fund activism data from 1999 to 2007. The main independent variables are
Degree centrality and Eigen-vector centrality of the activist, both of which are dened in Section 3.
Activist xed eects, industry xed eects and year xed eects are included in all specications.
In all regressions, I control for Target characteristics which are listed and dened in the Variables
Denition table in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the activist level, and t statistics
are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
CARijt = β1Centrality Measureit + ρZt + θi + γt + λIndj + σijt











Eigen Vector 0.033∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(2.15) (2.24)
Specic -0.013 -0.021 -0.013 -0.021
Purpose (-0.62) (-1.59) (-0.62) (-1.59)
No. of Past -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
Engagements (-0.52) (-0.60) (-0.70) (-0.83)
Activist Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Engagements 937 939 937 939
R-Squared 0.067 0.067 0.068 0.069
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Table 4: Loss of Connections and Funds’ Investments
Panel A shows the eect of connections between an activist and major shareholders in a rm on the likelihood of
being targeted by the activist. The sample I used for this test includes both rms targeted by hedge fund activists.
ConnectionsDummy is equal to one if there is at least one investor that is connected to the activist and has signicant
ownership in the rm for at least one quarter during a three-year window before the announcement. Lost Connection
captures the percentage of the connections between the activist and investors with signicant ownership that is lost due
to manager turnovers at mutual funds. Panel B presents the eect of connections between an activist and an investor
on the investors’ investments in rms targeted by the activist. The sample I use to run this test includes all rms that
are owned by investors connected to hedge fund activists. Connection Dummy is equal to one if the investor has a
connection to the activist that has targeted the rm.
Panel A: Targeting Firms Owned by Allies









Connection Dummy 0.086∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(17.44) (13.63) (5.69) (5.23)
Lost Connections -0.081∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.035∗∗
×Connection Dummy (-6.51) (-5.61) (-2.11) (-2.30)
Engagement Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Characteristics No Yes No Yes
Number of Engagements 30,482 20,101 30,482 20,101
R-Squared 0.101 0.122 0.100 0.121
Panel B: Change in Connected Investors’ Ownership









Connection Dummy 0.279∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(4.92) (4.63) (6.09) (6.13)
Lost Connections -0.316∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗ -0.061∗ -0.089∗∗
×Connection Dummy (-3.29) (-2.71) (-1.67) (-2.23)
Activist Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Characteristics No Yes No Yes
Number of Engagements 39,350 35,910 39,350 35,910
R-Squared 0.103 0.092 0.148 0.150
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics-Connection Loss
The sample consists of hedge fund activist engagements announced between 1999 and 2007. Panel A shows dierent
measures and characteristics that capture the lost connections between activists and mutual funds due to manager
turnovers at these funds. No. of Lost Connections is equal to the average number of connections that an activist
loses due to manager turnovers at mutual funds. Lost Degree variable captures the percentage of Degree lost due
to the turnovers. Lost Degree Number Weighted and Lost Degree Percentage Weighted are similar to Lost Degree with
connections weighted by the number of co-ownerships in dierent targets by two investors in the network and average
size of the ownership in dierent targets by two investors in the network, respectively. Lost Eigen Vector is the
percentage of Eigen Vector lost due to the turnovers.
Panel A: Connections Loss and Centrality Measures
Mean 50th S.D. N
No. of Lost Connections 1.05 1.00 0.75 368
Lost Degree 1.40 0.87 1.85 368
Lost Degree Number Weighted 1.51 1.28 1.19 368
Lost Degree Percentage Weighted 1.50 1.18 1.40 368
Lost Eigen-Vector 4.55 2.42 5.80 368
Lost Eigen-Vector Number Weighted 14.58 3.33 19.20 368
Lost Eigen-Vector Percentage Weighted 13.78 5.45 16.69 368
Panel B: Target Firms’ Characteristics and Connections Loss
Target Characteristics Loss Dummy=1 Loss Dummy=0 Dierence
Ln(Market Value) 5.597∗∗∗ 4.762∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗
Growth 0.173∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ -0.007
Cash Flow 0.011 -0.033∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
Leverage Ratio 0.337∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.021
Cash Ratio 0.184∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗
R&D Ratio 0.048∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗
Long-term Debt 0.204∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.012
Tobin’s Q 1.836∗∗∗ 1.914∗∗∗ -0.079
Book to Market Ratio 0.809∗∗∗ 1.017∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗
Amihud 0.338∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Connection Loss and Long-term Eects
The dependent variable is the industry adjusted ROA in columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) and abnormal
annual return in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6). The sample uses the data on activists’ targets three
years before and three years after an activism announcement between 1999 and 2007. The main
independent variables are Lost Degree centrality and Lost Eigen-vector centrality of the activist,
which capture the percentage of the activists’ network that is lost due to mutual fund manager
turnovers. Times dummy variables that indicate the number of years that has passed since the
announcement. Activist xed eects, Target xed eects, Industry xed-eects, year xed-eects
and Pre-event dummy variables are included in all specications. Standard errors are clustered at
the target level, and t statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Long− Term Performanceij =β1Percentage of Lost Centralityit × 1t+1
+ β2Percentage of Lost Centralityit × 1t+2
+ β3Percentage of Lost Centralityit × 1t+3
+ ρZt + Year Dummies+ ηj + γt + θi + λIndj + σijt









Lost Degree ×1t+1 -0.052∗∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.013 -0.019
(-2.03) (-2.34) (-1.43) (-1.63)
Lost Degree ×1t+2 -0.021 -0.031 -0.014∗ -0.032∗∗
(-0.89) (-1.58) (-1.69) (-2.41)
Lost Degree ×1t+3 0.046 0.036 -0.007 -0.023∗
(0.63) (0.54) (-1.00) (-1.77)
Lost Eigen-Vector ×1t+1 -0.081∗∗ -0.051∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(-2.44) (-1.83) (-4.21) (-4.42)
Lost Eigen-Vector ×1t+2 0.029 0.006 -0.022∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.09) (-4.17) (-3.15)
Lost Eigen-Vector ×1t+3 0.071 0.067 -0.013∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
(0.73) (0.84) (-2.81) (-4.39)
1t+1 0.084 0.078 0.034∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.089 0.076 0.036∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗
(1.35) (1.38) (2.69) (2.29) (1.44) (1.35) (2.81) (2.49)
1t+2 0.087 0.085 0.042∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.091 0.084 0.046∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(1.52) (1.56) (2.60) (2.74) (1.59) (1.55) (2.74) (3.00)
1t+3 0.106 0.092 0.041∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.110 0.088 0.046∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(1.49) (1.40) (2.13) (2.38) (1.55) (1.33) (2.31) (2.69)
Activist Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-event Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Characteristics Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Number of Engagements 5,441 6,162 5,854 7,130 5,441 6,162 5,854 7,130
R-Squared 0.229 0.201 0.856 0.459 0.230 0.201 0.856 0.460
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Table 8: Connection Loss and Success Rate of the Campaigns
The dependent variable of OLS regressions in this table is a dummy variable that indicates whether
or not the activist is successful in its campaigns. The sample consists of hedge fund activism data
from 1999 to 2007. The sample is limited to the engagements in which the hedge fund activist has
a specic goal at the time of the announcement. The main independent variables are Lost Degree
centrality and Lost Eigen-vector centrality of the activist which show the percentage of the activists’
network that is lost due to mutual fund manager turnovers. Activist xed-eects, industry xed-
eects and year xed-eects are included in all specications. Standard errors are clustered at the
target level, and t statistics are shown in parentheses *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Successijt =β1Percentage of Lost Centralityit ∗ Tacticijt+
β2Percentage of Lost Centralityit + β3Tacticijt + ρZt + θi + γt + λIndj + σijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Success Dummy Success Dummy Success Dummy Success Dummy
Lost Degree -0.038∗∗∗ -0.017∗
(-3.69) (-1.95)
Lost Eigen-Vector -0.032∗ -0.008
(-1.68) (-0.54)






Activist Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12: Activists Centrality and Mutual Funds Ownership
The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is the percentage of target shares that is owned by mutual
funds at the time of the announcement. The change in the percentage of ownership by mutual funds
in activists’ targets is used as the dependent variable in regressions (3)-(4). The sample consists of
hedge fund activism data from 1999 to 2007. The main independent variables are Lost Degree cen-
trality and Lost Eigen-vector centrality of the activist which show the percentage of the activists’
network that is lost due to mutual fund manager turnovers. Activist xed-eects, industry xed-
eects and year xed-eects are included in all specications. In all regressions, I control for Target
characteristics which are listed and dened in the variables denition table in the Appendix. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the activist level, and t statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Mutual FundsOwnershipijt = β1Percentage of LostCentralityit+ρZt+θi+γt+λIndj+σijt









Lost Degree -0.778∗∗ -0.669∗∗
(-1.99) (-2.15)
Lost Eigen-Vector -1.136∗∗ -1.880∗∗∗
(-2.34) (-2.93)
No. of Past 0.031∗ 0.018 0.017 -0.000
Engagements (1.72) (0.99) (1.28) (-0.03)
Activist Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Engagements 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036
R-Squared 0.300 0.301 0.049 0.072
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Table 13: Connection Loss and Used Tactics in Activism Campaigns
The dependent variables of OLS regressions in this table are dummy variables that indicate whether
the activist uses hostile tactics to achieve his goals. The sample consists of hedge fund activism
data from 1999 to 2007. The main independent variables are Lost Degree centrality and Lost Eigen-
vector centrality of the activist which show the percentage of the activists’ network that is lost due to
mutual fund manager turnovers. Activist xed-eects, industry xed-eects and year xed-eects
are included in all specications. Standard errors are clustered at the activist level, and t statistics
are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Hostility Dummyijt = β1Percentage of Lost Centralityit + ρZt + θi + γt + λIndj + σijt




Lost Degree -0.142∗∗ -0.137∗∗
(-2.21) (-2.10)
Lost Eigen-Vector -0.150∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗
(-3.38) (-4.18)
No. of Past -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
Engagements (-0.36) (-0.87) (-0.59) (-1.51)
Activist Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1: Variable Description
Variable Denition
Control Variables:
Market Value Market capitalization in millions of dollars
Growth The growth rate of sales over the previous year
Cash Flow Cash ow is dened as (net income + depreciation and amortization)/assets (lag).
Leverage Ratio Leverage Ratio is the book leverage ratio dened as debt/(debt + book value of equity)
Cash Ratio Cash Ratio is dened as (cash + cash equivalents)/assets
R&D to Assets R&D expenses in COMPUSTAT divided by lagged asset value
Long-term Debt Long-term debt over market value of assets
Tobin’s Q dened as (book value of debt + market value of equity)/(book value of debt + book value of equity)
Book to Market Ratio dened as (book value of equity/market value of equity)




Degree The number of connections between an activist and other investors in the network.
Eigen Vector Total number of connections between an activist and other investors in the network wighted
by other investors connectedness.
Lost Degree The percentage of connections that an activist has lost due to mutual fund manager turnovers.
Lost Eigen-Vector The percentage of Eigenvector centrality that an activist has lost due to mutual fund manager turnovers.
Activism Characteristics and Outcome Variables:
CAR(-20,+20) The abnormal market reaction to engagement announcement, which is computed over the window (-20,+20) .
CAR(-10,+10) The abnormal market reaction to engagement announcement, which is computed over the window (-10,+10) .
Specic Purpose A dummy variable that identies whether an activist mentions any goal in the item 4 of the 13D ling.
Hostile Tactic A dummy variable that identies whether an activist runs a proxy ght or threats to run a proxy ght during the campaign period.
Hostile Initial Tactic A dummy variable that shows whether an activist announces a proxy ght or threatens to run a proxy ght in the initial 13D ling.
Success Dummy A dummy variable that identies whether an activist has been successful in achieving its goals. A campaign
is dened as successful if the activist either achieved the goals stated in the 13D ling or settled with management.
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Table A2: Connection Loss and the Percentage of Ownership
The dependent variable is the percentage of stock ownership that activist acquires prior to the an-
nouncement. The sample consists of hedge fund activism data from 1999 to 2007. The main inde-
pendent variables are Lost Degree centrality and Lost Eigen-vector centrality of the activist which
show the percentage of the activists’ network that is lost due to mutual fund manager turnovers.
Activist xed-eects, industry xed-eects and year xed-eects are included in all specications.
Standard errors are clustered at the activist level, and t statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Percentage of Ownershipijt = β1Percentage of Lost Centralityit+ρZt+γt+λInd+σijt









Lost Degree -0.236∗∗ -0.676∗
(-2.33) (-1.93)
Lost Eigen-Vector -0.307∗∗ -0.447
(-2.28) (-1.43)
No. of Past -0.013 -0.016 -0.045 -0.048
Engagements (-0.92) (-1.18) (-1.48) (-1.53)
Activist’s Size 0.181 0.151
(Billion Dollar) (1.12) (0.91)
Activist Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Engagements 993 993 557 557































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A5: Placebo Test for the Eect of Network Position
The sample used in this test contains both the activist engagement sample and a pseudo activism
sample that includes stocks that are owned by a sample of long-short equity hedge funds. Condi-
tions that should be satised to add stocks-funds events to the pseudo sample are twofold. First,
the hedge fund’s holding of that stock should increase signicantly in a period, and the change in
ownership should be revealed to the public through 13F lings for the rst time. Second, no other
hedge funds should le schedule 13D or 13G in the same period. The sample starts in 1999 and ends
in 2007. The main independent variables are Lost Degree centrality and Lost Eigen-vector centrality
of the activist which show the percentage of the activists’ network that is lost due to mutual fund
manager turnovers. Activist xed-eects, Industry xed-eects and year xed-eects are included
in all specications. Standard errors are clustered at the activist level, and t statistics are shown in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
CARijt =β1Centrality Measureit + β2Centrality Measureit × Placebo Dummy+
ρZt + θi + γt + λIndj + σijt









Lost Degree -0.018∗∗ -0.012
(-2.33) (-1.53)
Lost Degree × 0.013 0.012
Placebo (0.92) (1.23)
Lost Eigen-Vector -0.008∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗
(-2.75) (-2.49)
Lost Eigen-Vector × 0.004 0.004
Placebo (0.40) (0.73)
No. of Past -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗
Engagements (-0.71) (-1.99) (-0.78) (-2.05)
Activist Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Engagements 1,264 1,269 1,264 1,269




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A11: Connection Loss and Information Revelation
The dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns around activism announcements. The
sample consists of hedge fund activism data from 1999 to 2007. The main independent variables are
Lost Degree centrality and Lost Eigen-vector centrality of the activist which show the percentage
of the activists’ network that is lost due to mutual fund manager turnovers. Prior Filing is a dummy
variable equal to one if the market receives information about activists’ ownership through quarterly
ndings prior to engagement announcements. Activist xed-eects, Industry xed-eects and year
xed-eects are included in all specications. Standard errors are clustered at the activist level, and
t statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
CARijt =β1Percentage of Lost Centralityit+
β2Percentage of Lost Centralityit × Prior Filingijt
+ Prior Filingijt + ρZt + θi + γt + λIndj + σijt









Lost Degree -0.050∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗
(-2.85) (-2.27)
Lost Degree × 0.012 0.022
Prior Filing (0.46) (0.89)
Lost Eigen-Vector -0.030∗∗ -0.019∗∗
(-2.34) (-2.56)
Lost Eigen-Vector × -0.003 0.010
Prior Filing (-0.13) (0.41)
Prior Filing -0.007 0.006 -0.007 0.008
(-0.32) (0.35) (-0.33) (0.46)
Activist Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Engagements 767 769 767 769
R-Squared 0.089 0.081 0.082 0.069
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Table A12: Pre-announcement Activists’ Centrality and Announcement Return
In this table, the sample of active investors in activist campaigns is constructed based on those
institutional investors that increase their ownership prior to the announcements. The dependent
variables are cumulative abnormal returns around activism announcements. The sample consists of
hedge fund activism data from 1999 to 2007. The main independent variables are Degree centrality
and Eigen-vector centrality of the activist, both of which are dened in Section 3. Activist xed
eects, industry xed eects and year xed eects are included in all specications. In all regres-
sions, I control for Target characteristics which are listed and dened in the Variables Denition
table in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the activist level, and t statistics are shown in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
CARijt = β1Centrality Measureit + ρZt + θi + γt + λIndj + σijt











Eigen Vector 0.013 0.017∗∗
(1.05) (2.06)
Specic -0.012 -0.021 -0.012 -0.021
Purpose (-0.55) (-1.50) (-0.55) (-1.50)
No. of Past -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
Engagements (-0.25) (-0.62) (-0.54) (-1.12)
Activist Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Engagements 937 939 937 939




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SecondChapter: Peer Eects inCorporateGovernancePrac-
tices: Evidence from Universal Demand Laws
1 Introduction
The impact of peers on rms’ and managers’ decisions has been the subject of a growing body
of research in the economic and nance literatures. Peer practices and decisions can convey
information or cause changes in the market environment that motivate rms and individuals
to undertake similar actions. Theoretical studies present dierent frameworks in which so-
cial interactions may inuence individual decisions (see, for example, Ellison and Fudenberg,
1995; DeMarzo et al., 2003). However, because the composition of peer groups and manage-
rial decisions are endogenously determined, estimation of peer eects is a major challenge for
empirical studies in this literature (Manski, 1993).
In this paper, we propose a novel method to identify peer eects in the area of corporate
governance. We address two broad questions. First, do peer eects acting through board inter-
lock networks inuence rms’ decisions to adopt particular governance provisions? Second,
can we identify the incentives that underlie the propagation of governance practices across
rms?
Board directors have an important role in passing and repealing governance provisions
(Bebchuk, 2005; Ertimur et al., 2010). Davis (1991) and Davis and Greve (1997) show that rms
tend to adopt poison pills and golden parachutes when other rms in their board interlock
networks have adopted similar provisions. Bouwman (2011) nds a link between board inter-
locks and the convergence of governance practices such as board size, outside directors, CEO
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duality, and compensation.1 However, while peer eects may induce rms to adopt similar
practices, Bouwman suggests that these empirical associations could alternatively arise from
rms’ decisions to select directors who are board members at rms with similar governance
preferences. A clean identication strategy is required to establish a direct impact of peer
groups on governance practice.
In order to estimate peer eects, the identication strategy needs to deal with the possi-
bility of reverse causality and omitted variables that may confound the estimation. Bouwman
(2011) notes that reverse causality will arise when board-interlock networks are endogenously
formed by rms with similar governance philosophies. Moreover, omitted variable bias can
result from an unobserved common shock that causes all rms in a board interlock network
to adopt similar practices. To overcome these concerns, we require an exogenous instrument
for the propensity of rms to adopt specic governance provisions that is orthogonal to both
board interlock formations and common factors aecting all rms in a particular network.
Our proposed instrument is the staggered passage of universal demand (UD) laws that
govern only rms incorporated in the aected states. In the period 1989-2005, 23 states passed
UD laws requiring the board’s approval for shareholders’ derivative litigation against directors
and ocers. This staggered passage is a relevant instrumental variable: Appel (2014) shows
that after the passage of these laws, rms increasingly adopted management- (as opposed
to shareholder-) friendly governance provisions such as poison pills, supermajority voting re-
quirements, and classied boards. We nd that rms incorporated in other states, but linked to
aected companies through a pre-existing interlock network, are also more likely to adopt such
governance provisions, even when their states of incorporation have not themselves adopted




Figure 1 illustrates our method. UD laws were passed in Georgia in 1989 and in Virginia
in 1992. Consider two rms, Firm G in Georgia and Firm V in Virginia. Firms G and V are
interlocked by two board members; one is Ms. X, who was elected to both rms before 1989.
This pre-existing interlock, therefore, is presumably exogenous to the passage of the UD law
in either state. However, once Ms. X is exposed to new governance policies made feasible
or preferable by the passage of the UD law in Georgia, her newly gained experience may
inuence her incentives and inform her actions on the board of Firm V, on which she also
serves. Crucially, because Ms. X was elected to both boards before UD laws were passed in
either state, a chain of inuence traceable to her would constitute evidence for a direct peer
eect, not contaminated by group self-selection.
[Figure 1 near here]
In contrast, Mr. Y was elected to both rms between 1989 and 1992. It is possible that
Mr. Y’s selection by Firm G may have been related in part to Georgia’s passage of the UD
law. Therefore, to identify peer eects, we wish to measure only Ms. X’s inuence as the
transmission mechanism. We therefore focus primarily on interlocks established before either
state has a UD law in place. While we may use Mr. Y’s inclusion on the board of Firm V as a
control variable in explaining rms’ governance choices, the key question will be how Ms. X’s
experience in one state aects the decisions of rms in the other states on which she serves.
The passage of UD laws addresses endogeneity concerns in several ways. First, UD laws
are ratied by state legislators and are likely to be independent of board interlock networks.
Moreover, for each pair of rms, we carefully select the interlocks that are already in place
before the passage of a UD law aects either rm in the pair. As illustrated in Figure 1, this
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procedure addresses the reverse causality concern in which board interlocks are established by
rms with common governance practices. Second, to deal with unobserved common factors,
we investigate peer eects in rm pairs where one rm is incorporated in a state with a UD law
and the other is incorporated in a dierent state without a UD law. By isolating spillovers to
the component that can be attributed to joint board members, we should eliminate the eects
of common shocks that potentially could aect both rms. Finally, the remaining concern is
that we will detect another eect (e.g., institutional investments) that is also triggered by the
UD laws and ows through director networks, thus leading to correlation with the adoption
of governance provisions at both rms. Although this mechanism is unlikely to generate our
ndings, we will include a range of rm-level control variables that are known to be correlated
with the adoption of governance provisions to mitigate this concern.
Our analysis produces several ndings. Our structural, 2SLS model shows that the pro-
jection of peer governance practices onto the prior UD law experience of a rm’s interlocked
directors is able to predict the rm’s own governance practices. This projection is, by de-
sign, independent of potential self-selection eects, and thus provides evidence in support of
causal peer eects. Consistent with this structural model, reduced form estimates conrm that
rms with more board members who have experienced the passage of UD laws through their
membership in other boards are signicantly more likely to adopt several pro-management
governance provisions; when the portion of these directors in the board increases from zero
to 50 percent, rms’ entrenchment index (E-Index; Bebchuk et al., 2009) increases on average
by 0.22 points, a substantial impact in the context of mean and median values of 2. The eect
of board interlocks is most signicant for poison pills, classied boards, and limits-to-change
bylaws. Increasing the portion of directors who have UD law experience by 50 percent raises
rms’ propensities to adopt a poison pill by 9.8 percent, a classied board by 6.9 percent, and
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limits-to-change bylaws by 6.5 percent.
Next, we investigate the underlying mechanism for the spillover eects of governance
practices among board-interlocked rms. One channel for spillover eects could come from
the impact of UD laws on directors’ incentives. Levit and Malenko (2015) demonstrate the
possibility of multiple governance equilibria. In a "strong governance" equilibrium, value-
maximizing and shareholder-friendly policies will enhance the value of directors’ human capi-
tal. But in a "weak governance" equilibrium, that value will be enhanced through management-
friendly policies. When states pass UD laws, they ease the way for management-friendly poli-
cies, and risk tilting the equilibrium toward the weak governance outcome. In this event,
aected rms are more likely to hire directors who are known for maintaining good rela-
tionships with managers, and potential directors will signal their value by demonstrating an
anity for management-friendly governance provisions. Consistent with these dynamics, we
nd that after the passage of a UD law, rms in the aected states are increasingly prone to re-
cruit directors who have experience in rms with management-friendly governance. Further,
our results suggest that interlocked board members who sit on a board of a rm incorporated
in a state that has passed a UD law are signicant actors in the adoption of these governance
provisions. Our empirical evidence for this transmission channel supports the Levit-Malenko
model.
This channel is also consistent with our ndings for the within-rm governance environ-
ment. We show that in the process of adopting governance provisions, directors seem to con-
sider relative power across the board of directors, management, and shareholders as it aects
their directorship outcomes. Firms with more powerful shareholders should be less inuenced
by the UD law experience of interlocked directors when making decisions aecting sharehold-
ers’ ability to discipline entrenched management. Consistent with this expectation, we nd
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that the eect of board experience with UD law is signicant for rms with low institutional
ownership, but insignicant in the presence of high institutional ownership. Likewise, rms
that employ governance provisions protecting management from takeover threats should ex-
hibit stronger eects of UD law experience. Using CEO duality as a proxy for management
power, we nd that the UD law experience of interlocked directors aects only rms for which
CEOs are also the board chairperson.
Our paper is related to two important strands of the corporate nance literature: the im-
pact of peer eects on corporate decisions, and the labor market for directors. The literature on
peer eects in corporations is relatively new and emerging. Recent studies have highlighted
peer associations relating to rms’ capital structure (Leary and Roberts, 2014), dividend payout
(Popadak, 2014), and nancial misconduct (Parsons et al., 2014). However, clean identication
of a causal relationship is a major challenge for studies in this literature (Manski, 1993). As
peer eects are not directly observable and are distinct from other industry and location fac-
tors, rm xed-eects models cannot mitigate major concerns about reverse causality and
omitted variables. The identication challenge is tackled in previous studies using statistical
methods (Leary and Roberts, 2014; Popadak, 2014)2 or by controlled experiments (Shue, 2013;
Ahern et al., 2014). The advantage of employing state-level policy changes in our identication
strategy is that it can be executed for large samples of rms and for several dierent corpo-
rate decisions. Our ndings regarding the role of board experience and the interaction among
the board, management, and shareholders provide further understanding of the underlying
mechanism for peer eects.
Our paper also contributes to the literature investigating the role of reputation in the labor
2To identify peer eects, Leary and Roberts (2014) use idiosyncratic equity returns as an exogenous varia-
tion to peer rms’ capital structure. Popadak (2014) identies the eects using three separate methods: excess-
variance, instrumental variable, and partial identication strategies.
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market for directors. Directors presumably wish to build reputations regarding corporate gov-
ernance so as to maximize their career prospects. But as the Levit and Malenko (2015) model
shows, multiple equilibria are possible, and either management- or shareholder-friendly rep-
utations may be optimal in dierent circumstances. One group of papers concludes that di-
rectors who are known as management-friendly are rewarded by the market through seating
in more boards. For instance, Helland (2006) concludes that directors supporting weak gov-
ernance actually enjoy a more successful career path. Using a sample of boardroom disputes,
Marshall (2010) nds that directors who resign in dissent from one board are not rewarded by
the market and suer higher probabilities of losing other positions in the ve years following
their resignation. However, another group of papers nds that a reputation for being share-
holder friendly is a valuable asset for directors. Fos et al. (2016) show that the closer directors of
a board are to the end of their directorship term, the more likely they act in favor of sharehold-
ers. Facing shareholder class action lawsuits (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007) and proxy contests
(Fos and Tsoutsoura, 2014) hurt a director’s reputation and the likelihood of being selected for
a directorship. Jiang et al. (2015) nd that dissention from the board is rewarded in the form
of outside directorships. Lel and Miller (2015) show that independent directors’ reputational
concern aects corporate governance practices. Our instrument allows us to demonstrate the
potential impact of the legal framework on the equilibrium in the market for directors’ ser-
vices. Our results on the apparent shift toward a weak-governance equilibrium after passage
of UD laws are new evidence on the importance of this determinant of corporate governance.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the institutional
background of UD laws and their impact on corporations. In Section 3, we describe our data
and empirical strategy. In Section 4, we develop our main hypotheses and in Section 5, we




The importance of shareholder legal rights for corporate governance is well established
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). A shareholder derivative lawsuit can be brought by a shareholder
or group of shareholders to reclaim value lost due to inappropriate management actions. As
opposed to class action lawsuits in which the plainti is a subset of shareholders, the plainti in
derivative lawsuits represents the interests of all shareholders. Therefore, derivative litigation
can be a distinct legal mechanism to address agency problems in public rms (Ferris et al.,
2007; Appel, 2014).
A shareholder group can sue management only when the corporation has a valid cause of
action, but has refused to use it. This failure often emerges when the defendant in the suit
is someone close to the company, for example, a director or a corporate ocer. In such a
case, the plainti will be the suing shareholder(s) and the corporation, and the defendant will
be the management or directors. In the suit, the plainti shareholder(s) must prove that the
management or directors have breached their duciary duties either by performing or failing
to perform certain actions. A key feature of this type of lawsuit is that if it is successful, the
proceeds go to the corporation, not to the shareholders who brought the suit. They benet
in part by the damages awarded to the rm, but more importantly, by eecting a change in
policy.
Shareholder derivative litigation has become increasingly common in merger and acqui-
sition transactions. For example, shareholders in Bank of America, led by two pension funds,
the Louisiana Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System and the Hollywood Police O-
cers’ Retirement System in Florida, sued the bank’s directors and former CEO, Kenneth Lewis,
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for misleading shareholders in the bank’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch & Co. The shareholders
claimed that the management and directors did not fully disclose that Merrill’s losses totalled
$15.84 billion in the fourth quarter of 2008 and that Merrill was still paying $3.6 billion in
bonuses in that quarter. The lawsuit was resolved with a settlement of $62.5 million paid to
the bank and a $20 million cash payout to shareholders for attorney’s fees.
As discussed, payouts in derivative lawsuits go to the corporation and are typically cov-
ered by the liability insurance of the rms’ directors. In some cases, however, the managers
or directors will pay the settlement to a separate entity with their own money. For instance, a
derivative lawsuit was brought against Lawrence J. Ellison, Oracle Corporation’s chief execu-
tive ocer, for insider trading in 2001. Mr. Ellison was accused of selling Oracle shares worth
approximately $894 million before disclosing that Oracle would miss its earnings target. The
stock dropped 45 percent after the news release. After four years of litigation, Mr. Ellison
agreed to pay with his own money a settlement of $100 million and $22 million in legal fees.
Since Mr. Ellison owned 24.5 percent of the rm, a direct payment to Oracle would benet
Mr. Ellison himself. Therefore, the settlement was paid in form of a charitable donation under
Oracle’s name to a charity chosen by the rm.
2.2. Universal Demand Laws
Although derivative litigation is intended to protect the interests of all shareholders, these
lawsuits have been criticized for primarily serving the narrow interests of the suing share-
holders. Some studies argue that derivative litigation is a means for the plaintis to extract
settlement fees rather than to improve corporate governance. In response to this criticism,
23 states passed Universal Demand (UD) laws between 1989 and 2005 to regulate shareholder
derivative lawsuits. Table A1 (see Appendix) reports a full list of states passing UD laws as
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well as the years in which those laws became eective.
Before commencing a derivative action against a purported wrongdoing, UD laws require
shareholders to rst make a written demand that the board of directors take corrective mea-
sures, but the board may argue that such action would result in irreparable damage to the rm.
The courts will dismiss a derivative action that is initiated before the board has responded to
the demand unless the board fails to respond within a reasonable time.
As board directors are usually among the defendants in the derivative litigation, it is almost
inevitable that the board will decide against the action. Hence, UD laws have become a major
roadblock for shareholder derivative lawsuits in the aected states. Appel (2014) shows that
after states pass UD laws, the average number of derivative lawsuits drops by a third.
3 Data and Methodology
The most important part of our identication strategy is the construction of the main ex-
planatory variable, UD Law Experience of Existing Board. Our goal is to construct a variable that
captures the propagation through overlapping director networks of the eects of UD laws on
the governance of rms in other, unaected states. There are three steps in constructing this
variable: determining each rm’s state of incorporation and headquarters, identifying board
interlock networks, and constructing the rm-level variable, UD Law Experience of Existing
Board.
3.1. State of Incorporation and State of Headquarter
To deal with the potential for unobserved common factors to aect governance decisions,
we track decisions that derive from board interlocks across rms incorporated in dierent
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states. Since the passage of UD laws in one state is unlikely to be correlated with an unobserved
factor aecting rms in another state, we mitigate concern about omitted variables. To collect
each rm’s historical state of incorporation and state of corporate headquarters, we use a
web crawler to extract the relevant data from SEC lings archived on the EDGAR server.3 As
EDGAR contains lings only since 1994, we must use 1994 data to ll in missing entries for
previous years. We merge the data on state of incorporation and state of headquarters with
Compustat using the Central Index Key (CIK); for rms with missing CIK, we match using IRS
employer number. We then create a dummy variable equal to 1 for state-years in which UD
laws were passed as well as for following years. There are no cases in our sample where a UD
law was later reversed by a state that had passed one in earlier years.
3.2. Board Interlocks
We use BoardEx as the main data source for constructing board interlock networks. BoardEx
started collecting data on top managers and directors holding positions in public rms in 1999.
The data were backlled for managers’ and directors’ past positions, educational background,
and other activities. Earliest positions reported on BoardEx date back to the 1920s. The data
contain a unique identication number for each director, allowing us to identify interlock di-
rectors who sit on the boards of dierent rms. The data also contain the start date and end
date of each board position. This allows us to build a panel in which each observation is a
rm-director-position-year.
3.3. UD Law Experience
Next, we merge the board interlock data with data about the state of incorporation and the
3Compustat reports only the current state of incorporation and current state of headquarters. This does not
allow us to track rms that have been incorporated and reincorporated in dierent states during our sample
period.
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state of corporate headquarters. Finally, UD Law Experience of Existing Board is constructed
as follows. First, we build an experience variable that shows whether each director has ex-
perienced a UD shock during the life of her directorship. We give an initial value of 1 to this
variable if a person is a board member of a rm incorporated in a state that passes a UD law. In
Figure 1, if Ms. X is a board member of rm G in Georgia in 1989 or thereafter, her experience
variable for 1989 is set equal to one. However, we depreciate the experience variable using an
exponential decay function that depends on the time gap between the year of each observation
and the year in which the UD law was passed. In our example, assuming it is 1992 and Ms. X
experienced the passage of the UD law in 1989 in Georgia, then using a depreciation rate of
0.15, the experience variable for Ms. X would equal exp(−.15 ∗ 3) = 0.64.4 Next, we sum the
UD experience values that each director receives from directorships in dierent rms in each
year and truncate his or her total value at a maximum value of one. Finally, we sum the expe-
rience value across the board members of each rm to build an experience variable at the rm
level. Therefore, if there are two board members of Firm V in Virginia during 1992, and both
of them experienced the passage of UD law in 1989 in Georgia, then using a depreciation rate
of .15, the experience value of Firm V in this year is set equal to 0.64 + 0.64 = 1.28. Note that
variable UD Law Experience of Existing Board only considers board interlocks that are in place
before a UD law is passed in either rm’s home state. This minimizes any concern that our
results are driven by selection eects, i.e., rms’ decisions to appoint directors who already
have prior UD law experience.
The eects of board members who have already experienced UD law passage before joining
4The proper depreciation rate is largely a matter of guess-work. We choose 0.15 to give a half-life of 5 years.
In the robustness check Table A4, we try a 0.25 depreciation rate and obtain similar results. In Table A5, we do
not use a depreciation rate but instead employ a dummy variable set equal to 1 in the year when UD law is passed
and the four subsequent years, and set equal to zero, otherwise. We obtain similar results in this specication as
well.
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the rm in question are captured in the variable UD Law Experience of New Board Members.
This variable is constructed similarly to UD Law Experience of Existing Board. In Figure 1,
the UD experience of Mr. Y would be measured by this variable. We normalize both of these
variables, UD Law Experience of Existing Board and UD Law Experience of New Board Members,
by the total number of board members.
3.4. Corporate Governance
The data source for rms’ governance provisions is the Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS), formerly known as Riskmetrics, database. Since these data are available only every other
year, we follow the standard practice in the literature of lling in missing years with data
from the previous year. We focus on the E-Index and its six component provisions: poison
pills, golden parachute, supermajority voting, classied boards, limits-to-change bylaws, and
limits-to-change charter. We use ExecuComp to nd CEO/Chairman duality for each rm-
year.
Our sample begins in 1990. As in the rest of the literature (see for example, Knyazeva
et al., 2013; Appel, 2014; Appel et al., 2016), the sample ends in 2006. This ending date is chosen
because the format of the ISS governance database in the post-2006 period is inconsistent with
that of the database in the period from 1990 to 2006.
3.5. Control Variables
Our main control variable is Neighbor States UD Law Status which equals the number of
neighboring state(s) (based on the rm’s headquarters) that have passed a UD law. We in-
clude this control variable to account for the possibility that the UD law status of neighboring
states could inuence both the formation of board interlocks and rms’ governance practices
(John and Kadyrzhanova, 2008). Other control variables for rms’ characteristics are derived
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from Compustat and CRSP. These include: total assets, leverage ratio, R&D expenditures, free
cash ow, ROA, and rm age. The data appendix provides detail on the construction of these
variables. We winsorize all accounting variables at the 2/98% levels.
Our nal sample consists of 11,814 rm-years from 1990 to 2006. Table 1 reports the mean,
median, standard deviation, top decile and bottom decile of each variable used in our analysis.
[Table 1 about here]
3.6. Univariate Relations
Before presenting formal hypotheses and tests, we present some univariate relations to mo-
tivate the analysis that follows. Table 2 shows some simple dierence-in-dierence statistics.
In each case, the treatment group comprises rms whose directors are exposed to adoptions of
UD laws because of their directorship positions in other rms in aected states. The control
group comprises rms with similar asset size and initial E-index, but without directors exposed
to such changes. We would expect the treatment group to exhibit no systematic dierences
in governance practices compared to the control group in the pre-UD ve-year period, but a
greater proclivity for management-friendly policies in the post-UD ve-year period. Column
(3) shows that the dierence in the E-index between the two groups increases by 0.098 in the
post-UD period, statistically signicant at 5 percent. The dierence in each individual com-
ponent of the E-index also increases, but given the greater noise in the components, only one
of the changes is statistically signicant.
[Table 2 about here]
Figure 2 examines the time trend of the E-index following adoption of UD laws in states
connected to the treatment group through a director network. The adoption of the law takes
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place sometime in the rst scal-event-year, which in Figure 1 is between time -1 and time
0. The evolution of the E-index of the treatment rms can be contrasted with that of several
control groups. The various controls in the four panels of the gure are formed by alternative
matching criteria, including rm size in year 0, the initial E-index in earlier years (either 3 or 5
years prior to the passage of the UD law), and/or industry SIC code. For all matching criteria,
the gure shows that the dierence in the E-index between the treatment and control group
noticeably rises in years 1 and 2 before generally leveling out.
[Figure 2 about here]
It appears that the passage of UD laws in one state aects the governance of rms in
unaected states, at least when there is a connection through interlocked directors. However,
more formal analysis is required to pin down the transmission mechanism.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
The main hypothesis that we wish to test is whether (and how) existing director networks
inuence rms’ propensities to mimic the governance provisions of connected rms. This is
expressed in the following formal hypothesis.
• Hypothesis 1: Firms that share directors with other rms that have experienced the passage
of UD Laws are more likely to adopt similar management-friendly governance provisions.
Our hypotheses will be tested in a regression framework in which adoption of various gov-
ernance provisions, or the E-Index summarizing several of these provisions, is the dependent
variable. While our hypotheses deal with the impact of UD laws on the propagation of gov-
ernance practice, we will begin with a simple specication, similar to those already in the
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literature, showing that board interlocks predict similarity of governance provisions. This re-
gression simply allows us to compare the associations in our sample with those documented
in previous studies (Davis, 1991; Davis and Greve, 1997; Bouwman, 2011). As in these studies,
we construct a sample comprising all rms that themselves are not subject to UD laws, but
which have a connection through interlocked directors to rms that are subject to such laws.
We estimate the following regression model:
(1)Firm Governancei,s,t+1 = β1Peer Governancei,t + θi + γs,t + σi,s,t+1
where Firm Governancei,s,t+1 in various specications denotes either the E-Index or a specic
governance provision of rm i in state of incorporation s, and year t+1. Peer Governancei,t is
the average value of that particular governance provision in other rms at which interlocked
directors have board seats. θi is the rm xed-eect, and γs,t is the state-year xed eect.
Table 3 reports rm xed-eects regressions, without instruments and with control vari-
ables included. The results are similar to those presented elsewhere in the literature. Each
dependent variable is a governance practice, or the E-Index of each rm, and the explanatory
variables are the average value of those same practices for rms with interlocked boards. The
coecients of E-Index, Classied Board, Bylaw Limits, and Charter Limits are positive and
statistically signicant at levels ranging from 1 percent to 10 percent, conrming a peer cor-
relation in governance patterns across rms. While most of these results simply conrm prior
ndings, some dier. For example, we nd that golden parachutes are less likely to spread
through board interlock networks. One potential explanation for this dierence is that our
sample diers, including more rm-year observations. Moreover, as noted, these tests cannot
distinguish between causal peer eects versus selection eects of directors across like-minded
rms.
82
[Table 3 about here]
4.1. UD Law-Based Estimates
As discussed above, endogeneity issues call into question the results in Table 3. Using
the staggered passage of universal demand (UD) laws as an exogenous instrument aecting
adoption of governance provisions, we are able address these concerns and disentangle peer
eects from other mechanisms that might explain these results. Appel (2014) documents that
rms in UD law states are systematically more management friendly, as evidenced by their
higher E-Indexes and higher propensities to adopt component provisions. We replicate the
tests in Appel (2014) and report these results in Table A3 in the Appendix. The passage of
UD laws appears correlated with management-friendly governance provisions and meets the
relevance condition for the instrument in our analysis.
The structural equation we wish to estimate is essentially the same as Equation 1. However,
to deal with the likely endogeneity of the Peer Governance variable, we re-estimate the equation
in an IV-2SLS framework. In the rst stage, we t Peer Governance onto our instrumental
variable, UD Law Experience of Existing Board, and then use the tted value of this variable in
the second-stage regression.
Therefore the rst-stage regression is:
(2)Peer Governancei,s,t = β1UD Law Experience of Existing Boardi,t
+ θi + γs,t + σi,s,t
In the second-stage regression, we replace Peer Governance with its tted value from equa-
tion 2 and thus estimate equation 3:
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(3)Firm Governancei,s,t+1 = β1Instrumented Peer Governancei,s,t
+ Firm Controlsi,s,t + θi + γs,t + σi,s,t+1
where Firm Controlsi,s,t is a vector of control variables for rm characteristics, θi is the rm
xed eect, and γs,t is the state-year xed eect. The 2SLS procedure ensures that the portion
of peer governance that can be attributed to UD law experience, but not the portion due to
self-selection, is allowed to inuence governance in the treatment rms in the second-stage
regression.
Table 4 reports estimates of the rst-stage equation 2, which is the relation between in-
terlocked directors’ UD Law experience, UD Law Experience of Existing Membersi,t, and inter-
locked directors’ governance experience at peer rms, Peer Governancei,s,t. Interlocked direc-
tors’ UD Law experience is strongly predictive of management-friendly governance provisions
at peer rms. The results hold with the inclusion of rm xed-eects, state-year xed-eects,
and rm controls. Specically, when the portion of board directors with UD Law experience
increases from zero to 50 percent, the average E-Index of peer rms increases by 0.62 points,
and the propensities of passing Poison Pill, Classied Board, Golden Parachute, and Super-
majority Voting provisions increase respectively by 19.4 percent, 13 percent, 21.9 percent, and
4.1 percent. Except for the Supermajority Voting model, the coecients are statistically sig-
nicant at the 1 percent level. Moreover, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, which is 12.1 for
Classied Board and greater than 20 for E-Index, Poison Pill, Golden Parachute, suggests that
UD Law Experience of Existing Board is unlikely to be a weak instrument. Our rst-stage re-
sults indicate that interlocked directors’ UD Law experience is a strong predictor of interlocked
directors’ governance experience at peer rms.
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[Table 4 about here]
Table 5 reports estimates of the second-stage regression, Equation 3. The coecients on the
instrumented peer rms’ governance are positive and statistically signicant at the 1 percent
level in the models for E-Index, Poison Pill, and Classied Board. A one point increase in the
instrumented E-Index of peer rms leads to an increase of 0.34 point in E-Index of the rm of
interest. Poison Pill and Classied Board are the two component provisions that contribute the
most to the detected eect. If the portion of peer rms which have poison pill and classied
board provisions in place each increase from zero to 50 percent, the rm of interest is 28.3
percent more likely to adopt a poison pill provision and 25.6 percent more likely to adopt a
classied board provision.
[Table 5 about here]
As an alternative to the 2SLS estimation, we also estimate a reduced form version of our
model, in which we specify governance practice as a function of UD Law Experience of Existing
Board as well as UD Law Experience of New Board Members. The specic regression equation
is:
(4)Firm Governancei,s,t+1 = β1UD Law Experience of Existing Boardi,t
+ β2UD Law Experience of New Board Membersi,t + θi + γs,t + σi,s,t+1
where Firm Governancei,j,k,s,t+1 is either the E-Index or each governance provision of rm i,
in state of incorporation s, in year t+1. We emphasize that the sample period for this regression
includes only years in which the second rm’s state has not yet adopted a UD law. Therefore,
a convergence of governance practices is presumably due only to the two rms’ common,
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interlocked directors, and cannot be a common response to similar changes in their regulatory
environments. The coecient of UD Law Experience of Existing Boardi,t, described in Section
2, is our main coecient of interest. This coecient tests the impact of those interlocked board
members who were appointed before either state put in place a UD law.
UD Law Experience of New Board Membersi,t, described in Section 2, is a control for the
impact of directors appointed after the passage of a UD law in one state, but its coecient
may also reect endogenous peer-group formation eects. θi is the rm xed-eect and γj,t
is the state-year xed eect. To ensure that time-varying characteristics are not driving the
results, we control for the number of neighboring states that have already passed a UD Law,
as well as total assets, rm age, book leverage, R&D, free cash ow, and return on assets.
Table 6 reports the estimation for regression equation 4. The results reported in Panel
A, which does not control for rm characteristics (but does include both rm- and state-year
xed eects), suggest that rms are more likely to adopt management-friendly governance
provisions when other rms in their director networks have experienced the passage of UD
laws. The coecient of primary interest, UD Law Experience of Existing Board, is positive and
statistically signicant at the 1 percent level for the E-Index. It also is positive and statisti-
cally signicant at the 1 percent level for Poison Pills, Classied Board, and Bylaw Limits. If
the portion of the board directors who have UD Law experience through interlocked boards
increases from zero to 50 percent, E-Index rises on average by 0.22 points, an increase equiv-
alent to 11 percent of the mean and median values of the E-Index of 2. Regarding component
governance provisions, increasing the portion of directors who have UD law experience by 50
percent raises a rm’s propensity to adopt a poison pill by 9.8 percent, a classied board by
6.9 percent, and limits-to-change bylaws by 6.5 percent.
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Panel B of the table reports results where other time-varying rm controls are also in-
cluded. Specically, we control for the number of neighboring states that already passed UD
Law, total assets, rm age, book leverage, R&D expenditures, free cash ow, and return on as-
sets. The economic and statistical signicance of β1, the coecient on the UD Law Experience
of Existing Board Members (i.e., members appointed to both boards before either state passed
a UD law), are mostly unchanged. The coecients on the experience of new board members
(those appointed after the rst state implemented a UD law) are generally larger than the coef-
cient on our instrumental variable. This highlights the potential importance of endogeneity
biases. It is likely that the higher point estimates for the impact of the new directors reects
at least in part selection and matching biases. In Panel B, it is notable that the coecient on
UD Law Experience of Existing Board is negative in the model for Charter Limits. However,
the impact is only signicant at the 10 percent level and is economically small, reducing rms’
propensity to adopt the provision by only 2.4 percent.
[Table 6 about here]
To conclude, our empirical strategy using UD Law as an instrument cleanly identies gov-
ernance practices of peer rms as an important factor explaining rms’ decisions to adopt
corporate governance provisions. Both the structural and reduced-form versions of the model
tell a consistent story. In the next part of the paper, we provide further analysis to suggest that
the reaction of interlocked directors to the change in the governance environment is a likely
channel through which governance practices are propagated among interlocked rms.
4.2. Director Reputation and the Market for Director Services
Directors’ desire to optimize their career outcomes could explain peer-eects in gover-
nance practices. In the Levit and Malenko (2015) model, regulatory changes may help deter-
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mine whether the economy settles on a strong- or weak-governance equilibrium. In a weak-
governance equilibrium, a management-friendly environment can engender higher demand
by corporations for directors with management-friendly reputations. On the supply side, to
maximize their directorship prospects, directors may choose to act in favor of shareholders [in
a strong-governance equilibrium] or management [in a weak-governance equilibrium] to sig-
nal that they are of the director type preferred by the market. The passage of UD laws, which
favors a weak-governance equilibrium, oers an opportunity to test this model. Therefore, we
pose the following hypothesis:
•Hypothesis 2: The demand for experienced management-friendly directors rises after states
pass UD laws.
To test this hypothesis, we estimate a regression equation in which each observation
corresponds to a rm-year in which new directors are elected to a board. The dependent
variable is the reputation of the appointees to each rm’s board, as measured by the average
value of the E-Index of the rms for which they have previously served (or by the average value
of a specic component of the E-Index). The explanatory variable is an indicator variable for
whether the rm’s state of incorporation has ratied a UD law. We hypothesize that rms in
UD-law states are more likely to hire directors from rms with more management-friendly
governance practices.
The results in Table 7 conrm that passage of UD law favors the recruitment of management-
friendly directors. In the model for the E-Index (column 1), the coecient on the post-UD law
dummy is positive and highly signicant at better than the 1 percent level. Similarly, the co-
ecients on the Post-UD Law dummy are signicant in explaining two of the components
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of the E-Index.5 The results indicate that the passage of a UD law makes directors who have
served on management-friendly boards in other states more attractive to the rm. As such, it
supports the Levit and Malenko (2015) proposition that regulatory changes can tilt the system
toward a weak-governance equilibrium.
[Table 7 about here]
The results in Table 7 show that the demand for directors with management-friendly rep-
utation increases when the legal environment encourages a "weak governance" equilibrium.
In the following step, we examine the response of interlocked directors to the increased in-
centives they face to demonstrate a management-friendly orientation. Specically, we test
whether the passage of a UD law in a state where interlocked directors have board seats makes
them more likely to adopt management-friendly governance provisions at rms in other states
where UD laws are not in place.
•Hypothesis 3: After one state has passed UD laws, interlocked directors who have board seats
at rms in that state are more likely to adopt management-friendly governance provisions
for their rms in other states where UD laws have not been passed.
We use the following model to test this hypothesis, for each director-year (utilizing direc-
tors of rms in states that have passed UD laws):
Firm Governancej,i,s,t+1 = β1Directors
′ UD Law Dummyj,t + Firm Controlsi,s,t
+ωj + γs,t + σj,i,s,t+1
(5)
5In another specication, we replace state xed-eects with rm xed-eects. The coecient on Post UD Law
is signicant at the 5 percent level and has similar economic magnitude. The results of this specication are
reported in Table A7.
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where j, i, s and t denote director j, rm i, state of incorporation s, and year t. The dependent
variable is the E-Index or one of its six component governance provisions of a rm in a state
that has not been aected by a change in the UD Laws (but which may have directors that have
been aected via their other directorship). The independent variable,Directors’ UD Law Dummyj,t,
is a dummy variable indicating whether the directors have board seats in a state where UD
laws have been passed. ωi is the rm xed-eect, γs,t is the state-year xed eect. Our initial
sample is all board position-years of interlocked directors. Then, we remove all the position-
years after UD laws come into eect since we are only interested in rms in states where UD
laws have not yet been passed.
Table 8 presents the results of this specication. The coecient on Directors’ UD Law
Dummy is positively and statistically signicant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels for the E-
Index and three component provisions. When an interlocked director experiences the passage
of UD laws at one rm, the E-Index of other rms where he/she has a board seat increase by
0.09 point. The eect derives largely from the increased propensity to adopt poison pill, 3.7
percent, classied board, 3.6 percent, and limit-to-change bylaws, 0.7 percent.
[Table 8 about here]
In sum, the test results for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 indicate that interlocked board
members’ incentive to maximize their career prospects is a plausible channel through which
governance practices are propagated among boards of directors.
4.3. Within-Firm Governance Environment
We expand our analysis further by investigating the within-rm governance environment.
If directors attempt to foster their career prospects as we hypothesize, the spillover eect in
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provision adoption is likely to be aected by the relative power of shareholders and manage-
ment. When shareholders are more powerful, the directors will presumably refrain from the
adoption of governance provisions that serve to entrench management. Conversely, when
managers are more powerful, the directors will be more inclined to adopt these provisions to
maximize their career outcomes. We use both the level of institutional ownership and CEO
duality as indicators of shareholders’ power. Therefore, Hypotheses 4A and 4B are:
•Hypothesis 4A: Firms with less institutional ownership that share director networks with
rms that have experienced the passage of UD Laws are more likely to adopt similar gover-
nance provisions.
•Hypothesis 4B: Firms with CEO duality that share director networks with rms that have
experienced the passage of UD Laws are more likely to adopt similar governance provisions.
We expect the coecient on UD Law Experience of Existing Board to be greater for rms
with less powerful management. Therefore, we expect that β1 in equation (4) for rms in the
lowest quartile of institutional ownership will be positive and signicant but will not neces-
sarily signicantly dier from zero for rms in the fourth quartile. Hypothesis 4B is similar,
except that it uses CEO duality as a measure of management power. In rms with duality,
the CEO has more power, and board members are more prone to act in his or her favor when
considering governance provisions. Therefore, β1 will be higher for rms with CEO duality:
Interlocked members with UD backgrounds may use their experience with other rms to help
management in the process of adopting these provisions.
Table 9 reports results for rms stratied by level of institutional ownership. For the
rm in the lowest quartile of institutional ownership (Panel A), the coecient on the UD
experience of existing board members is positive and statistically signicant at the 5 percent
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level in explaining the E-Index and at the 1 percent to 10 percent levels in explaining three
component provisions.6 In contrast, the coecient on UD Law experience is near zero and is
not signicantly dierent from zero for the high institutional ownership quartile. Similarly,
none of the models for individual components of the E-Index generally produce statistically
signicant coecients.
[Table 9 about here]
Table 10 reports tests of Hypothesis 4B where CEO duality is used as a measure of man-
agement power. For rms with CEO duality, the coecient on UD Law experience is signi-
cant at 1 percent in explaining the E-Index (Panel A), but that coecient is not signicant for
rms without CEO duality (Panel B). Turning to the component governance provisions of the
E-Index for rms with CEO duality (Panel A), the Classied Board and Bylaw Limits models
show positive and statistically signicant coecients on UD law experience at the 1 percent
level, but for rms without CEO duality (Panel B), only the Bylaw Limits model has a positive
and signicant coecient. These results are consistent with our expectation that more pow-
erful shareholders would weaken the spillover eect of provision adoption through director
networks while more powerful management would enhance the eect.
[Table 10 about here]
6Like Table 6, this table and the next use data only from before the adoption of a UD law in the second state.
This ensures that any changes in governance cannot be attributed to the adoption of a UD law in that state. This
regression design assures that the only transmission mechanism can be through the interlocked directors who
have gained UD law experience in their other directorships.
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5 Conclusion
While convergence of governance practices among rms linked through board interlocks
has long been noted, the source of that convergence is extremely dicult to ascertain. It
may be attributable to peer eects, whereby directors on one board are inuenced by the
experience and preferences of their peers. On the other hand, apparent convergence also
would be observed simply through selection eects, in which rms with similar governance
preferences recruit directors with similar preferences.
To tease out peer eects, one requires an instrument that is related to governance prac-
tice, but is unrelated to selection eects. The staggered adoption of Universal Demand laws
across states provides just such an instrument. We nd that after the passage of such laws,
rms in aected states increasingly adopt management-friendly governance provisions. We
also show that the management-friendly policies adopted by a rm governed by a UD law
tend to be mimicked by other rms within that interlocked director network. Crucially, by
restricting the sample to networks formed by appointments to boards of rm pairs prior to
the adoption of a UD law by the state of either rm, we can be condent that this apparent
propagation of policy cannot be due to selection eects.
One transmission mechanism seems to work through the market for director services.
In a strong-governance equilibrium, directors will increase the value of their human capital by
signaling a proclivity for shareholder-friendly governance. But in a weak-governance equilib-
rium, a management-friendly reputation will be optimal. Universal Demand laws, which make
it harder to sue directors for dereliction of their duties toward shareholders, can tilt the equilib-
rium toward the weak-governance outcome. We nd that after passage of such laws, rms are
more likely to recruit directors currently serving on other management-friendly boards; inter-
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locked directors are thus incentivized to signal that they are management-friendly. Moreover,
directors’ career considerations seem to respond to the balance of power among directors,
management, and shareholders. Directors in rms with fewer strong shareholders are more
prone to respond to UD laws with management-friendly governance provisions. Similarly,
they are more inclined to adopt such provisions when the CEO is stronger.
We conclude that regulation can aect the nature of the equilibrium in the market for
directors’ services by changing the incentives faced by directors in dealing with conicts of
interest between managers and shareholders.
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1989: GA passes UD Law
Firm G in GA
1989
1992: VA passes UD Law
XFirm V in VA
Ms. X: Interlock director
who was elected to both Firm G
and Firm V before passage of UD law
Mr. Y: Interlock director
who was elected to
Firm V after passage of UD law
Figure 1: Hypothetical Timeline for Adoption of Universal Demand Laws
Time line showing hypothetical adoption of UD laws in two states and the appointment of
board members of two rms in those states. Georgia adopts UD laws in 1989 and Virginia
in 1992. Ms. X is appointed to both boards before the adoption of UD laws in either state.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean p10 p50 p90 S.D. N
UD Law Experience of Existing Board 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.05 11,814
UD Law Experience of New Board Members 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 11,814
E-Index 2.07 0.00 2.00 4.00 1.31 11,814
Poison Pill 0.55 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 11,814
Classied Board 0.57 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 11,814
Golden Parachute 0.59 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 11,814
Supermajority 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.36 11,814
Limits to Amend Bylaws 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 11,814
Limits to Amend Charter 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 11,814
Neighbour States UD Law Status 1.54 0.00 1.00 3.00 1.21 11,814
Total Assets 7.22 5.47 7.07 9.29 1.45 11,814
Book Leverage 0.37 0.00 0.36 0.73 0.31 11,814
R&D to Assets 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.07 11,814
Free Cash Flow 0.21 0.02 0.18 0.43 0.21 11,814
Return on Assets 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.23 0.12 11,814
Firm Age 26.79 8.00 26.00 48.00 15.26 11,814
New Directors’ Reputation
E-Index Reputation 2.19 1.00 2.00 3.50 1.09 2,200
Poison Pill Reputation 0.58 0.00 0.67 1.00 0.42 2,200
Classied Board Reputation 0.59 0.00 0.67 1.00 0.42 2,200
Golden Parachute Reputation 0.66 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.41 2,200
Supermajority Voting Reputation 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.31 2,200
Charter Limits Reputation 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 2,200
Bylaw Limits Reputation 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 2,200
Details about variable contruction as in Appendix A2
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Table 2: Univariate Analysis
In this table, we examine the eect of a change in board members’ experience of passing
Universal Demand laws in other states on governance practices in place. The sample con-
sists of rm-year observations between 1995 and 2001. This sample includes rms that
experience the change in this period, the treatment group, and rms that do not experience
the change, the control group. The rst two columns show the dierence of governance
provisions before the change in the experience of board members and after the change in
the experience. The third column shows the dierence between the dierences before and
after the change in experience, and the t-stat of the dierence shown in the parentheses. *,
**, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-UD Experience Post-UD Experience Pre-Post Dierence
E-Index 0.264 0.386 0.098∗∗ (2.151)
Poison Pill 0.067 0.078 0.002 (0.063)
Classied Board 0.093 0.101 0.002 (0.151)
Golden Parachute 0.013 0.088 0.073∗∗∗ (2.755)
Supermajority Voting 0.012 0.031 0.013 (1.131)
Charter Limits -0.003 0.006 0.008 (1.348)
Bylaw Limits 0.082 0.083 0.001 (0.082)
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Table 3: Board Interlocks and Adoption of Governance Provisions
The dependent variables are E-Index and each of the six provisions contained in the index.
Governance data are from ISS from 1990 to 2006. The main independent variable is average
value of the governance practice of other rms at which interlocked directors have board
seats. Firm xed-eects and state of incorporation-year xed-eects are included in all spec-
ications. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation-year level and shown
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Firm Governanceist = β1Peer Governanceit + θi + γst + σist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)























Firm Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firm-Years 12,278 12,278 12,278 12,278 12,278 12,278 12,278









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1: Universal Demand Legislation
This table lists the states of incorporation with universal demand (UD) laws and the corre-
sponding eective year and statute reference. The nal column reports the number of rm-
year observations in the sample. Source: Appel (2014)
Year State Citation
1989 GA Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-742
MI Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.1493a
1990 FL Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.07401
1991 WI Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.742
1992 MT Mont. Code. Ann. § 35-1-543
VA Va. Code Ann § 13.1-672.1B
UT Utah Code. Ann. § 16-10a-740(3)
1993 NH N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A:7.42
MS Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-7.42
1995 NC N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-7-42
1996 AZ Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-742
NE Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2072
1997 CT Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-722
ME Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-C, § 753
PA Cuker v. Mikalauskas (547 Pa. 600, 692 A.2d 1042)
TX Tex. Bus. Org. Code. Ann. 607.07401
WY Wyo. Stat. § 17-16-742
1998 ID Idaho Code § 30-1-742
2001 HI Haw. Rev. Stat. § 414-173
2003 IA Iowa Code Ann. § 490.742
2004 MA Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. Ch. 156D, § 7.42
2005 RI R.I. Gen. Laws. § 7-1.2-710(C)
SD S.D. Codied Laws 47-1A-742
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Table A2: Variable Description
Variable Denition
UD Law Experience of Existing Board Experience of board interlocks that are in place before a UD law
is passed in either rm’s home state
UD Law Experience of New Board Members Experience of board interlocks who join the rm after a UD law
is passed in either rm’s home state
Neighbor States UD Law Status A dummy variable that is equal to one if one of the neighbor states
has passed UD law.
New Directors’ Reputation Average governance practices of the rms in which an interlock
director has served as a board member in the ve years prior
to joining a new rm
Logarithm of Total Assets Logarithm of lagged asset value in COMPUSTAT
Book Leverage Book value of debt(long-term debt + current liabilities) divided
by the sum of book value of debt and book value of equity
R&D to Assets R&D expenses in COMPUSTAT divided by lagged asset value
Free Cash Flow Operating activities net cash ow minus investing activities
net cash ow divided by lagged asset value



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Third Chapter: Do Hedge Fund Activists Exit Silently?
Evidence from Short Selling Activities
1 Introduction
Hedge funds use equity derivatives, short sale, and other capital market developments
to decouple voting rights from economic ownership, often without public disclosure (Hu and
Black 2006, 2007). Short selling is a powerful instrument for hedge funds to make a profit
out of arbitrage opportunities. As an example, hedge funds can simultaneously short the
acquirer’s stock and long target’s shares (Dai et al. 2011). They can also short borrower’s
stock before syndicated loan announcements or amendment announcements (Massoud et
al. 2011). Since there is significant information asymmetry between activists and other
shareholders, I test the hypothesis that hedge fund activists use short sale to partially exit
from their position without letting market know about their decision.
Although shareholder activism has long been studied in the finance literature, hedge
funds’ activism recently emerged as a central interest of research in this literature. As
Figure 1 shows, the number of engagements, measured by the number of 13D filings, by
hedge fund activists increased over time, and if it was not because of recent financial crisis,
we would observe greater number after 2008. In their seminal work, Brav and his coauthors
(2008) investigate the effect and role of hedge funds in successful engagements. Their paper
and other studies show that market reacts positively to 13D announcements by hedge funds
and they improve their targets’ performance through CEO turnover (Del Guercio et al. 2008
and Brav et al. 2008), opposing a merger (Klein and Zur 2009), divesting assets (Clifford
2008), restructuring capital (Klein and Zur 2009, Zur 2007), and increasing opacity (Kang,
Ozik and Sadka 2015). To make these changes in target firms, hedge funds employ different
tactics such as selling their shares (Bharath et al. 2013, Edmans et al. 2013), negotiating
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with CEO and board members (Brav et al. 2008), and confronting the target’s management
(Del Guercio et al. 2008, Klein and Zur 2009). While prior studies provide increasing
understanding of activists’ intervention strategies and different tactics to implement these
strategies, much less is known about exiting strategies of hedge fund activists. This paper
begins to fill this gap in the literature by examining possible hedge funds’ short selling
activities before their exit announcements. Short selling the target’s stock by an activist
could happen for the reasons if she feels that market would react negatively to the exit
announcement or she thinks that front runners increase her cost of exiting.
[Figure 1 about here]
The current disclosure requirements for block holders make short selling an attractive option
for hedge funds to exit out of their positions. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
requires 13D (13G) schedule to be filed within 10 days if any institutional or individual
investor reaches 5 percent threshold of the public company’s shares and has (has not) plans
to influence the target firm. Schedule 13D requires disclosure of all filers’ transactions in
the company’s stock during the past sixty days or since the most recent filing of Schedule
13D, whichever is less, and accordingly would include a description of the acquisitions and
dispositions during the 10-day period between the event that triggered the filing requirement
and the filing itself. However, the rule on short sale disclosure is not as clear. While complete
disclosure of short selling positions has been called upon (Hu and Black 2006, 2007), there is
currently no law or regulation mandating the disclosure of short positions (Wachtell Lipton
2008). Therefore, hedge funds can sell off all of their positions or part of it in their targets,
without public disclosure.
In this paper, first I compare the average short interest in the final two months before exit
announcement to the average in former four months, and find that the pattern of jump in
the targets’ short interest before hedge funds’ exit announcements is more common among
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firms that are targeted by a small group of activists compared to other activists targets.
Second, I find that both the probability of observing a jump and the magnitude of a jump in
short interest is significantly correlated with the hedge funds’ activism experience1. Third,
the motivation for this silent exiting strategy is more likely hedge funds’ desire to lock their
profits and exit safely as opposed to hedge funds’ ability to predict announcement returns.
My results are most in line with the hypothesis that activists use short sale to sell off their
positions on the quiet.
There might, however be several alternative explanations for my findings. A spike in
short interest could be explained by other factors such as reverse causality, simultaneity
and information leakage. Reverse causality expresses that hedge funds start exiting their
position when they observe abnormal short sale activities in the market. Next alternative
explanation, simultaneity, reasons that something else, such as negative news, is causing the
correlation between short sale jumps and exit announcements. Last alternative, information
leakage, relates the jump in short interest to trading of other hedge funds that have private
information about exit announcements by activists. If simultaneity or reverse causality
was the case, we would observe downward price movements before or around the same
time as activists exit from their position. Therefore,I rule out the reverse causality and
simultaneity explanations by controlling for holding returns in different time windows before
exit announcement. After controlling for holding returns in different windows before exit
announcement, all my results still hold, indicating that reverse causality and simultaneity
are not significant concerns in my analysis. To negate the information leakage explanation,
I investigate the distribution of the exit announcement return. The univariate analysis
of the return around exit announcement indicates that the exit return distribution in the
1To measure funds’ characteristics, I borrow three variables from Krishnan et al. (2015) and Boyson et al
(2015): experience, size of previous investments, average return around previous 13D announcements. Re-
sults in these papers imply that mentioned variables explain the positive return around 13D announcements.
I add another variable, the average holding return of previous engagements, which explains positive market
reaction to 13D announcements to the set of funds’ characteristics.
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sample is asymmetric (skewed to the right) but symmetric (slightly skewed to the right) in
a subsample consisting of engagements in which short interests increase. Since arbitrageur
funds that could be the short sellers and have private information from hedge fund activists
seek events (exit announcements) in which expected return is negative and short interest
shocks reappear when the firm is targeted by a hedge fund in a small subgroup of activists,
it is less likely that information leakage explains the spikes in short interest.
This paper contributes to three strands of literature. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first paper introducing short selling by hedge fund activists as a possible exiting
strategy. Focusing on the end part of hedge fund activism engagements, exiting, it completes
the general strand of hedge fund activism literature that looks at hedge fund activism from
different aspects, in particular the effect of engagements on targets’ governance. Brav et
al. (2008) is the first paper that scrutinizes this effect and pioneers in hedge fund activism
literature2. Brav et al. (2008) and other following papers (Mayer, and Rossi (2008), Clifford
(2008), Greenwood and Schor (2009), Klein and Zur (2009), Brav et al. (2010), Becht
et al.(2011), Brav et al. (2013), Bebchuk et al. (2013), and Gantchev (2013)) in this field
show that the market reacts positively to hedge funds’ activism engagement announcements.
They try to describe how hedge funds make changes in their targets that lead to a rise in
firm value and operating performance. It is also shown that target prices decline upon the
exit of an activist only after it has been unsuccessful (Brav et al. 2008) or upon the exit
announcements by opaque hedge funds (Kang, Ozik and Sadka 2015). Nevertheless, besides
categorizing engagements in groups based on the form of exiting and examining the market
reaction to exit announcements, none of them have tested processes by which hedge fund
activists offset their position. Testing one of the possible exiting strategies, silent exiting,
in hedge fund activism, this paper is the first one that looks at offsetting strategies that are
employed by hedge funds to exit from their position in their targets.
2See also Partnoy and Thomas (2006) and Kahan and Rock (2007).
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Second, this paper is related to prior literature on financial regulations, in particular
regulations on reporting by hedge funds. Correcting regulations regarding short sale is a
major concern in the literature, and some of the papers in prior literature provide empirical
evidence for this concern. Anderson et al. 2012 implies that hedge funds make profit out of
the family firms’ private information that has become available to them. Massoud et al. 2011
states a similar conjecture about misusing private information by hedge fund participants in
syndicated loan market. In addition, Martin and Partnoy (2005) argues that one share/one
vote could be suboptimal because the economic ownership can be decoupled from voting
rights via trading in derivatives and short selling. Pointing out the same fact, Hu and
Black (2006, 2007) proposes new regulatory regimes for reporting in financial markets, which
would solve asymmetric information problems in the hedge fund activism. In this paper, I
provide evidence that activist funds short sell to escape from financial regulations that make
them reveal their exiting from their position in their targets. My results help justifying
the regulatory change, suggested in Hu and Black (2006), in reporting short sale positions.
Finally, it contributes to the literature on voice vs. exit (Admati and Pfleiderer (2009),
Edmans and Manso (2011), Gopalan (2005)), showing that institutions can exit from their
position with lower cost. Lower cost of exit makes it a more powerful tool for changing
targets’ governance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I describe the data collection process
and sample description in section 2. I test related hypotheses empirically in sections 3 and
express the possible extensions to this paper in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Data Construction and Summary Statistics
As there is no universal database for hedge fund activism, the hand collection of this
sample is necessary. I use 13D filings filed by hedge fund activists from 1994 to 2011. My
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sample is an extended version of the sample used in Brav et al. 2008. After cleaning the
sample, I extract more information from 13D, 13D/A, 13F filings.
I use 13D filings to complete my database with the size of ownership. SEC requires active
(passive) investors to file 13D (13G) in 10 (45) days within 10 days after their position exceeds
a threshold of 5 percent. Each of the 13D co-filers should declare their position’s size in a
separate section. I use this requirement and collect information on the ownership of the
funds in my sample and the aggregate ownership.
Another variable which is crucial for my analysis is the exit date. In the literature, papers
use different methods to approximate hedge funds’ exit date from SEC filings. The most
common way is to use quarterly 13F filings to identify changes in ownership (Brav et al.
2008 and Kang, Ozik and Sadka 2015). I however, use a more accurate method to identify
exit date through 13D amendments which is reported within 10 days of 1% change in filers’
holdings. Therefore, it is possible to track the trend of activists’ holdings in their targets
and find the time that they sell off their shares. Although I use both ways to have the exit
date for bigger portion of my sample, my prior for calculation is using 13D amendments
because not only I can calculate the exit date more accurately but also I can keep track of
the positions belong to the funds in my sample. I call a day exit date when funds’ position
fall below 5 percent or become half of their initial position. To calculate exit date from 13F
filings, I rely on the same procedure used in Brav et al. 2008.
I used four characteristics of activist funds to analyze their behavior in engagements: av-
erage holding returns(cumulative abnormal returns between ten days before 13D announce-
ments and five days before exit announcements), average 13D announcement returns (cumu-
lative abnormal returns between ten days before and five days after 13D announcements),
average investment size, and experience. Two return based variables, average holding return
and average 13D announcement return, are calculated based on market reaction to hedge
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funds’ performances and engagements in their previous targets. The other two, average in-
vestment size and experience, come from their decisions on investment size and the frequency
of their previous engagements. Following Zur (2007) argument and to make these measures
more meaningful, I exclude the first three investments. After these screens, I have 1692
engagements in my sample which belong to 132 hedge fund activists. As panel A in Table II
shows, I have exit date for 1496 observation in the sample, and 863 of them are calculated
based on 13D/A.
Finally, I match my sample with CRSP database and Quarterly Compustat database to
obtain stock returns and financial data. After these matchings, I complete my sample with
Monthly Supplemental Short Interest database in Compustat.
Table 1 reports definitions of all control variables used in my analyses. To make sure
that results are not the consequences of using improper proxies for control variables, I rely
on Brav et al. proxies.
Table 2 describes my sample. Panel A provides detailed information on the number of
observations and hedge funds in my sample. Panel B in Table 2 displays the distribution
by year, and Panel C displays it by industry. Firms in my sample span all 12 industries in
Fama-French classification. In panel D, I show the distribution of hedge funds in the sample
by their experience, the number of their past 13D engagements.
Panel E reports the summary statistics of control variables (targets’ characteristics) I
used in my regressions. Although the period associated with my sample is different from
that in Brav et al. (2008), most of the variables’ mean and median are similar to the
ones in their paper. Consistent with prior literature, hedge funds target firms with positive
earnings, i.e., the mean EBITDA/Assets is 2%, and positive levels of cash and debt, i.e. its
mean (Cash+Short-term-Investment)/Assets is 21% and (Total Debt)/Assets is 32%. Panel
F summarizes investment characteristics such as the return around 13D announcement and
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exit date, and the return on the holding period.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Short Sale Measures
As Figure 2 displays, I consider two time windows (A and B) before exit announcement
to calculate changes in the short interest. I choose 60 days to make sure that at least one
monthly short interest observation falls in each time window. Comparing the monthly short
interests in these time windows, I build two measures, Normalized Change in short interest
and Change Dummy, to test the variations in short interest level before exit announcement.
Normalized Change is equal to change in short interest level from period A to period B
normalized by the number of total outstanding shares. Change Dummy indicates activisms
that fall in the top 10 percentile of the normalized change distribution. This dummy measure
allows me to check which targets fall in the right tale of normalized change distribution and
marks the observations in which short interest increase abnormally.
[Figure 2 about here]
3.2 Repetitive Short Sale
Currently there is no information on the short sellers and all databases have short interest
data just on the firm level. Showing that the short interest increase is more common amongst
firms that are targeted by a group of hedge fund activists leads us to the identity of short
sellers. To test repetitive short selling, I define a history variable for each activist that
measures how many times previous targets of the activist face an increase in the short
interest before exit announcements. Results in Table 3 columns one and two imply that
facing one short interest increase in a previous target raises the probability of facing it in the
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new target by 0.8 percentage point. Compared to average 11 percent probability of facing
an increase in the short interest, 0.8 percentage point increase is considerable. This result
is consistent with the hypothesis that not all the activists but only group of them employ
silent exiting strategy, offsetting positions via shorting targets’ stock.
To mitigate the endogeneity concern when more experienced activist has the higher prob-
ability to face another spike in short interest, I normalized the history variable by the activist
experience, number of his previous engagements, and run the same tests. As columns three
and four in Table 3 show the results stay the same. Based on the coefficients in these columns,
if an activist faces short sale increase in 20% of his previous targets, the probability that he
faces that in his new target rises by 5.6%.
3.3 Short Sale and Funds’ Characteristics
I next investigate the relation between attributes of activists and short sale variations be-
fore exit announcement. First, I examine which types of activists engage in exiting strategy
via short selling. I use four attributes to define activist funds: the average of 13D announce-
ment return, the average of holding return, average size of previous investments, and the
number of their previous engagements.
Columns one and two in Table 4 imply that funds with more experience face increase
in short interest more than other funds. Excluding observations without accurate exit date
(exit date calculated based on 13D amendments), I run the same tests and observe similar
results. I present this result in columns three and four of Table 4. Therefore, I continue my
analysis by focusing on the effect of funds’ experience on increase in the short interest before
exit announcements.
Before moving to the next section, it is worth mentioning that there are many fund
characteristics that are left uninvestigated. For instance, Funds’ asset under management
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and opacity can explain portion of the variation that we observe in the short interest.
3.3.1 Univariate Analysis on Experience
I formalize my tests on my sample by conducting univariate tests of short selling prior
to exit announcements according to funds’ experience (shown in Panels A, B of Table 5).
In panel A, we observe that funds whose targets face an increase in short interest are more
experienced activists. As this table indicates, funds that face an increase in short interest
for the first time are more experienced than funds that have not faced any spike in short
interest. History variable in these tables includes both activists’ current engagement and
previous engagements.
I compare the experience mean and the median of the funds that categorized in separate
groups based on their history (including current engagement) in panel B, and the results
comply with the first panel.
3.4 Prediction vs. Risk Aversion
Up to now, I have shown that there is a correlation between funds’ experience and increase
in short interest. Yet I have not explained the line of reasoning behind this correlation.
Assuming short selling by experienced activists is the reason for spike in the short interest,
I propose two possible hypotheses that can explain results in previous sections and rule out
one of these hypotheses empirically in following parts.
3.4.1 Two Alternative Hypotheses
Funds that have more experience have established some reputation and have more re-
sources (human capital and money). Hence, it is possible that these funds are better at
predicting market reaction to their exit announcement and tend to lock their investments’
profit before the reaction. If that is the case, we should observe that targets of these funds
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face increase in short interest when market reacts negatively to the exit announcement.
Moreover, evidence should imply that firms that are targeted by activists have a higher
chance of facing an increase in short interest when he has experienced jumps in his previous
targets’ short interest and exit return is negative.
H2-a (Prediction): Activists who have experienced jump in their previous targets employ
silent exiting more compared to other funds because they are better at predicting stock
return around exit announcement.
Another possible hypothesis that explains the results is risk aversion, more reputation
a hedge fund has more risk averse it gets. Since it is hard to survive as a successful hedge
fund in the market and build a reputation, hedge funds follow less risky strategies in their
investments to preserve their reputation capital. Therefore, they are ready to pay extra
premium for a safer strategy and sell off part of their position through short sale.
H2-b (Risk Aversion): Activists who have experienced jump in their previous targets
employ silent exiting more than other activists because they are more risk averse than other
funds.
3.4.2 Empirical Results
Table 6-Panel A examines the determinants of the exit announcement period returns.
It reports the regression coefficients, and the associated t statistics in parenthesis based on
heteroskedasticity-consistent industry-clustered standard errors, of different specifications of
the following regression explaining the exit announcement returns:
NormalizedChange(ChangeDummy) = γX+β1Exitret+β2History+β3Exitret×History+
β1 shows how activists’ prediction of exit return affects their decision to short sell. To
find out which hypothesis can better explain the relation between increase in the short
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interest and funds’ history, it requires interpreting β1 and β3 together. If the first hypothesis
holds, activists who shorted before exit announcements in their previous targets short sell
when they expect the market to react negatively to the announcement. In addition, since
the assumption claims that these activists are better at predicting price movements at the
time of announcement, I also expect to see β3 negative and significant. However, even if
both coefficients are significant and negative, second hypothesis is not proved yet. These
coefficients could be the result of difference between right tales of exit return distribution
in the subsample consisting of observations in which short interest increase and exit return
distribution in rest of the sample.
As in Panel A in Table 6 β1 is negative and significant but β3 is not significant. To
confirm the results, I repeat this test using the normalized history variable. Coefficients
in both columns three and four also reject the prediction hypothesis. To understand the
reason behind negative coefficient of exit return, I show a univariate analysis of exit returns
in Table 7. This table shows that the exit return distribution in the subsample consisting
of observations in which short interest increase is similar to the distribution in rest of the
sample in the left tale. Thus, the difference in the right tales makes the exit return coefficient
negative.
To make sure that my findings are not the results of differences between funds that
face short interest spike and other funds, I rerun all the mentioned tests on the sample
which consists of observations of funds that face short interest increase at least once in their
engagements. Panel B in Table 6 implies that the results stay the same.
Putting all these results together, I conclude that activists use silent exiting strategy,
exiting through short sale, when the distribution of expected exit return is not skewed to
the right side and the buy and hold return in the period between 13D announcement and




Previous results indicate that there is a relation between exit announcement and variation
in short interest level. However, I have not ruled out the reverse causality, activist starts
exiting after sudden increase in short interest, and simultaneity, decision to exit and short
sale increase happening at the same time. If reverse causality or simultaneity explains
correlation between increases in short interest and funds’ decision to exit, then we should
observe negative price movement before exit announcement. To test them, I control for buy
and hold returns in different time windows before exit announcement.
Column one through six in Table 8 (Panel A and B) show the results when I control
for buy and hold return in different time windows between exit announcement and exit
announcement. Results stay the same after I control for the buy and hold return in different
time intervals.
Up to now I have tested two out of three alternative explanations for observing an increase
in short interest before exit announcement and rule them out. However, there is another
channel, information leakage, which explains the results. In the previous section, I argue
that why this channel is not the reason behind a spike in short interest, and in the next
section, I discuss and propose possible ways and identification strategies that help dealing
with this concern.
4 Conclusions
I find evidences regarding activist targets and short interest variations. Tracking short
interest level in hedge fund activists targets I show that, for a group of hedge fund activists,
there is a jump in short interest level for the targets stock before the funds announce their
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exit decision. This suggests activist funds short sell to offset part of their position in their
targets before exit announcements. However, there are other alternative hypotheses such as
reverse causality, simultaneity, and information leakage. To rule out reverse causality and
simultaneity, I control for holding returns in different time windows before exit announcement
and show that results stay the same. Based on the symmetric distribution of the return
around exit announcements in the subsample consisting of engagements in which they face
a jump in the short interest, information leakage could not explain results on the relation
between short interest jumps and exit announcements.
My findings also suggests that experienced funds are more likely to exit via short selling.
However, I do not find any significant relation between other activist funds characteristics
and the increase in short interest.
Finally, I show that skills in predicting market reaction to exit announcement do not
explain why activists choose this strategy. Using univariate analysis, OLS and Probit model,
I claim that hedge funds offset part of their position in their targets via shorting the same
stock as a safe exit strategy and a way to lock their profits.
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Figure 1: Yearly Distribution of 13D Engagements
Figure 2: Short Sale Proxies
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Table 1: Control variables Description
Variables Description
ROA Return (Net Income) on Assets
Amihud Yearly Average of 1000*(—Daily Return—/Trading Volume)0ˆ.5, using daily data
M/B Market Value of Equity to Book Value of Equity
Cash-ratio (Cash + Cash equivalents)/Assets
Institutional Shareholders the Number of Institutional Shareholders
Institutional Ownership Portions of Targets that are Owned by Institutional Shareholders
Market Value Firm’s Stock Value
age Firm’s Age
Leverage-ratio Total Debt/Assets
Table 2.Panel A: Sample Description and Summary Statistics
Sample Description No. of Observation No. of Funds
Total 2656 479
After dropping low-frequent investors 1692 132
After dropping observations without exit date 1496 124
After dropping observations without 13D/A exit date 863 117
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Table 2.Panel C: Industry Distribution
Industry Groups Freq. Percent
Consumer NonDurables 130 4.950
Consumer Durables 61 2.320
Manufacturing 225 8.570
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction 90 3.430
Chemicals and Allied Products 46 1.750
Business Equipment 547 20.83
Telephone and Television Transmission 97 3.690
Utilities 37 1.410
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 296 11.27





Table 2.Panel D: Experience Distribution




































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Normalized Change is equal to change in short interest level normalized by the number of total outstanding shares.
Change Dummy indicates engagements that fall in the top 10 percentile of the normalized change distribution. Short History
is the number of funds previous engagements in which short interest jumps before the exit announcement. Normalized Short
History is equal to Short History that is normalized by funds experience. All t-statistics adjust for heteroscedasticity and are
clustered by industry. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Normalized Change Change Dummy Normalized Change Change Dummy
ROA 0.0044 -1.4241*** 0.0056 -1.3174***
(0.010) (0.506) (0.009) (0.448)
Amihud -0.0026* -2.3696*** -0.0022* -2.0887***
(0.001) (0.652) (0.001) (0.579)
M/B 0.0005* 0.0294 0.0004 0.0306
(0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.019)
Cash-ratio -0.0009 -0.4137 0.0001 -0.3264
(0.003) (0.395) (0.003) (0.390)
Institutional Shareholders -0.0000 0.0017 -0.0000 0.0011
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Institutional Ownership -0.0062** -0.4205 -0.0051 -0.3127
(0.003) (0.372) (0.003) (0.390)
Age -0.0001 -0.0047 -0.0000 -0.0012
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004)
Market Value 0.0001 -0.0644 0.0002 -0.0680
(0.000) (0.062) (0.000) (0.078)
Leverage-ratio 0.0028 0.0934 0.0030 0.1555
(0.002) (0.193) (0.002) (0.178)
Pre-exit return -0.0000 0.0703 0.0002 0.0918
(0.000) (0.071) (0.000) (0.064)
Short Sell History 0.0010*** 0.0611***
(0.000) (0.017)
Normalized Short Sell History 0.0313* 1.9415**
(0.015) (0.850)
Constant 0.0018 -0.5458* 0.0008 -0.7244**
(0.003) (0.329) (0.003) (0.336)
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 586 586 586 586
R-squared 0.0490 - 0.0385 -
Adj. R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.0308 0.1274 0.0200 0.1182
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Table 4: Normalized Change is equal to change in short interest level normalized by the number of total outstanding shares.
Change Dummy indicates engagements that fall in the top 10 percentile of the normalized change distribution. All t-statistics
adjust for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by industry. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels.
Sample: Observations with 13D and 13F exit date Observations with 13D exit date
Dependent Variable: Normalized Change Change Dummy Normalized Change Change Dummy
ROA 0.0038 -1.4048** 0.0028 -1.1646
(0.012) (0.550) (0.014) (0.718)
Amihud -0.0029* -2.4964*** -0.0041** -2.1893***
(0.001) (0.791) (0.002) (0.754)
M/B 0.0004 0.0271 0.0004 0.0357**
(0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.015)
Cash-ratio -0.0002 -0.3025 -0.0089 -0.8477
(0.004) (0.443) (0.006) (0.678)
Institutional Shareholders -0.0000 0.0019 -0.0000 0.0022
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Institutional Ownership -0.0042 -0.2863 -0.0034 -0.5025
(0.003) (0.343) (0.004) (0.417)
Age -0.0000 -0.0040 -0.0001 -0.0033
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.005)
Market Value -0.0001 -0.0717 0.0000 -0.0603
(0.000) (0.056) (0.000) (0.050)
Leverage-ratio 0.0030 0.0746 0.0015 -0.1190
(0.002) (0.200) (0.002) (0.266)
Pre-exit return -0.0001 0.0822 0.0001 0.1274
(0.000) (0.080) (0.000) (0.103)
Average Holding Return (Last Two Engagements) 0.0006 0.0056 0.0015 -0.0068
(0.003) (0.292) (0.004) (0.254)
Experience Number 0.0001*** 0.0052** 0.0001* 0.0053**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Average Announcement Return -0.0016 -0.0047 -0.0008 -0.0039
(0.002) (0.205) (0.002) (0.218)
Average Investment Size (Last Two Engagements) -0.0069 -0.0914 -0.0059 -0.9376
(0.007) (0.751) (0.006) (0.606)
Constant 0.0012 -0.6523 0.0052 -0.4350
(0.004) (0.403) (0.004) (0.550)
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 540 540 336 336
R-squared 0.0424 - 0.0469 -
Adj. R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.0168 0.1235 0.0053 0.1195
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Table 5-Panel A: Univariate Analysis of Experience Dummy and Short Sale History












Table 5-Panel B: Univariate Analysis of Experience Number and Short Sale History













Table 6-Panel A: Normalized Change is equal to change in short interest level normalized by the number of total outstanding
shares. Change Dummy indicates engagements that fall in the top 10 percentile of the normalized change distribution. Short
History is the number of funds previous engagements in which short interest jumps before exit announcements. Normalized
Short History is equal to Short History that is normalized by funds experience. All t-statistics adjust for heteroscedasticity and
are clustered by industry. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Change Dummy Change Dummy Change Dummy Change Dummy
ROA -1.2349** -1.2406** -1.1368** -1.1147**
(0.498) (0.494) (0.454) (0.446)
Amihud -2.2683*** -2.2355*** -2.0055*** -1.9687***
(0.611) (0.590) (0.565) (0.533)
M/B 0.0269 0.0266 0.0283 0.0277
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Cash-ratio -0.3761 -0.3940 -0.2699 -0.2750
(0.344) (0.344) (0.341) (0.343)
Institutional Shareholders 0.0012 0.0012 0.0006 0.0008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Institutional Ownership -0.4776 -0.4694 -0.3827 -0.3994
(0.356) (0.363) (0.365) (0.359)
Age -0.0499 -0.0494 -0.0492 -0.0511
(0.056) (0.056) (0.067) (0.065)
Market Value -0.0028 -0.0030 0.0003 0.0005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Leverage-ratio 0.0545 0.0472 0.1148 0.1103
(0.186) (0.185) (0.169) (0.168)
Pre-exit return -0.9029** -0.7226* -0.9611** -0.5210
(0.457) (0.393) (0.480) (0.520)
Short Sell History 0.0580*** 0.0582***
(0.015) (0.015)
Short Sell History*Pre-Exit return -0.0674
(0.077)
Normalized Short Sell History 1.7684** 1.8206**
(0.835) (0.849)
Normalized Short Sell History*Pre-Exit return -5.3440
(3.862)
Constant -0.4853* -0.4906* -0.6476** -0.6640**
(0.288) (0.289) (0.295) (0.292)
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 603 603 603 603
Pseudo R-squared 0.125 0.1257 0.1161 0.1185
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Table 6-Panel B: The subsample consists of observations of funds that face short interest increase at least once in their
engagements. Normalized Change is equal to change in short interest level normalized by the number of total outstanding
shares. Change Dummy indicates engagements that fall in the top 10 percentile of the normalized change distribution. Short
History is the number of funds previous engagements in which short interest jumps before exit announcements. Normalized
Short History is equal to Short History that is normalized by funds experience. All t-statistics adjust for heteroscedasticity and
are clustered by industry. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable: Change Dummy Change Dummy Change Dummy Change Dummy
ROA -1.3855*** -1.3870*** -1.3396*** -1.3197***
(0.511) (0.510) (0.493) (0.497)
Amihud -2.1055*** -2.0802*** -1.9971*** -1.9655***
(0.516) (0.501) (0.466) (0.445)
M/B 0.0263 0.0261 0.0246 0.0243
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Cash-ratio -0.3798 -0.3941 -0.3348 -0.3434
(0.364) (0.365) (0.352) (0.352)
Institutional Shareholders 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Institutional Ownership -0.5709 -0.5625 -0.5131 -0.5179
(0.410) (0.421) (0.400) (0.399)
Age -0.0406 -0.0404 -0.0471 -0.0486
(0.067) (0.067) (0.071) (0.070)
Market Value -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Leverage-ratio 0.1932 0.1884 0.2395 0.2374
(0.181) (0.181) (0.170) (0.170)
Pre-exit return -1.1507** -1.0174** -1.1915** -0.8818
(0.504) (0.449) (0.485) (0.747)
Short Sell History 0.0287* 0.0288*
(0.016) (0.016)
Short Sell History*Pre-Exit return -0.0380
(0.068)
Normalized Short Sell History 0.0686 0.1078
(1.034) (1.059)
Normalized Short Sell History*Pre-Exit return -3.0791
(4.592)
Constant -0.1527 -0.1586 -0.1843 -0.2007
(0.306) (0.310) (0.305) (0.311)
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 423 423 423 423
Pseudo R-squared 0.0961 0.0963 0.091 0.0917
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Table 7-Panel A: Sample consists of all observations that have short sale information.
Normalized Change< 1%
Statistics mean p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 sd
Exit Return 0.0426 -0.141 -0.0953 -0.0291 0.0152 0.0837 0.191 0.287 0.187
Normalized Change> 1% (Top 10 percentile)
Statistics mean p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 sd
Exit Return 0.0231 -0.129 -0.0868 -0.0302 0.0226 0.0722 0.139 0.220 0.146
Table 7-Panel B: Sample consists of all observations that have short sale information.
Normalized Change< 1%
Statistics mean p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 sd
Exit Return 0.0425 -0.127 -0.077 -0.024 0.0145 0.0819 0.178 0.274 0.152
Normalized Change> 1% (Top 10 percentile)
Statistics mean p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 sd
Exit Return 0.00137 -0.149 -0.118 -0.0528 0.00803 0.0626 0.123 0.171 0.142
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